

PART I

GENERAL GROVES

- 2 cameras

ATOMIC BOMB
WITH GENERAL
GROVES
ROLL 1 END 1

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, AS THE MANHATTAN PROJECT EMPLOYED MORE THAN A HUNDRED THOUSAND--I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY MORE PEOPLE THAN THAT IN VARIOUS PLACES AROUND THE COUNTRY DURING THE TIME IT WAS PREPARING THE BOMB--WOULD YOU COMMENT ON HOW YOU WERE ABLE TO KEEP MOST OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD...HOW YOU WERE ABLE TO KEEP SECRET FROM THEM WHAT YOU WERE DOING?

GROVES: WELL, WE HAD A TOTAL OF OVER 600,000 THAT WENT THROUGH THE PROJECT IN ONE CAPACITY OR ANOTHER, NOT COUNTING THOSE WHO WORKED IN FACTORIES ON THE MANUFACTURE OF EQUIPMENT. THE PEAK EMPLOYMENT RAN UP PRETTY CLOSE TO 150,000 BUT THE BASIC PLAN OF KEEPING IT AS SECRET AS POSSIBLE WAS BASED ON A SIMPLE PRINCIPLE: NO ONE WAS TO KNOW ANYTHING MORE THAN HE NEEDED TO DO HIS JOB BUT HE MUST KNOW EVERYTHING THAT WAS NEEDED TO DO THAT JOB. THERE WAS ANOTHER THING THAT APPEALED TO THE PRIDE OF EVERYONE, AND THAT WAS THE GETTING ACROSS THE IDEA THAT LOTS OF PEOPLE LIKE TO APPEAR IMPORTANT BY TELLING WHAT THEY WERE DOING AND ALL ABOUT IT. WE MADE THEM FEEL A LITTLE BIT MORE IMPORTANT BY BEING ABLE TO SAY, "WELL, I'M WORKING ON SOMETHING THAT IS SECRET. I'M SORRY I CAN'T TELL YOU WHAT I'M DOING."

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, YOU SAID IN YOUR BOOK THAT VERY EARLY YOU RECOGNIZED THAT RUSSIA WAS THE ENEMY AND YOU CONDUCTED THE PROJECT ACCORDINGLY. WOULD YOU COMMENT ON THAT?

GROVES: THE ENEMY IN THE SENSE THAT IT WAS A FUTURE ENEMY...

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, WOULD YOU START OVER AGAIN. MY QUESTION IS NOT GOING TO BE INCLUDED...

GROVES: OH, ALL RIGHT, I'LL TAKE CARE OF THAT.

SND 1

GROVES:

SECURITY FROM
THE RUSSIANS

ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE START OF THE PROJECT, I RECOGNIZED THAT WE SHOULD PROTECT THE SECRETS AS FAR AS WE COULD; NOT ONLY FROM OUR ENEMIES, GERMANY AND JAPAN BUT ALSO FROM RUSSIA, AND THAT MEANT GENERALLY PROTECTING IT FROM EVERY OTHER NATION. THE REASON FOR THAT WAS THAT THIS PROJECT WAS BEING PAID FOR BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND IT WAS NOT MY PRIVILEGE TO GIVE AWAY SOMETHING THAT REALLY BELONGED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THEREFORE, WE STARTED ON THIS BASIS OF EXTREME SECRECY. IT HAD ALREADY BEEN THE POLICY ESTABLISHED; FIRST BY THE SCIENTIFIC PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRY--ALMOST ALL OF THEM, AND IT HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY APPROVED OF BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, BY SECRETARY STIMSON, THE SECRETARY OF WAR, GENERAL MARSHALL, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND ADMIRAL KING, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

FDR didn't tell
STATE

ACTUALLY, IT WAS HELD SO SECRET THAT MR. ROOSEVELT WOULDN'T EVEN TELL ANYONE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT IT. THEN SECRETARY HULL SAID AFTERWARDS THAT APPARENTLY MR. ROOSEVELT THOUGHT THAT SOMEBODY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD TALK TOO MUCH AND THE LEAK WOULD BE ON. ONE THING THAT IS NOT REALIZED BY MOST PEOPLE: THE MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE SECRECY WAS TO ENABLE US TO HAVE A COMPLETE MILITARY SURPRISE WHEN THE BOMB WAS USED. I HOPE THAT TAKES CARE OF THAT ONE.

FREED:

I THINK SO. I THINK YOU ALSO SAID SOMETHING THAT I THINK I WOULD LIKE YOU TO ENLARGE ON A LITTLE MORE IF YOU WOULD. THERE WAS, DURING THE BUILDING OF THE BOMB, NO QUESTION IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE AT THE HEAD OF THE PROJECT, THAT THIS BOMB WAS A MILITARY WEAPON WHICH WOULD BE USED.

No question
about would be
used

GROVES:
THERE WAS NEVER ANY QUESTION AS TO THE USE OF THE BOMB, IF IT WAS SUCCESSFULLY DEVELOPED, ON THE PART OF ANYONE WHO

WAS IN A TOP POSITION IN THE PROJECT AND WHO KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE WAS NO OBJECTION VOICED BY ANYONE EXCEPTING FOR, I BELIEVE, TWO MEN WHO HAD CERTAIN RELIGIOUS SCRUPLES AND TALKED ABOUT THEIR FEAR OF WHAT THIS MIGHT DO, BUT IT WAS MOSTLY A FEAR THAT—RATHER AN AVERSION TO KILLING. ONE OF THESE WAS A QUAKER ENGINEER AS I REMEMBER AND HE RAISED THE QUESTION. HE CONTINUED TO WORK ON THE PROJECT AFTER HE WAS SUITABLY TALKED TO, NOT IN A THREATENING WAY BUT IN, YOU MIGHT SAY, AN ARGUMENTATIVE WAY IN WHICH WE EXPLAINED JUST WHAT THE PURPOSE WAS AND ALL OF THAT. THE OTHER GROUP THAT CAME IN LATER AND OBJECTED TO THE USE OF THE BOMB DID NOT OBJECT UNTIL AFTER V-E DAY IN EUROPE, AND THEY WERE MOSTLY...THEY WERE CENTERED AROUND PEOPLE WHO WERE BITTERLY ANTI-GERMANY AND WHO DID NOT APPEAR TO FEEL THE SAME WAY TOWARD JAPAN.

2 Groups who protested

Franck Committee ?

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, I ASSUME THAT THIS GROUP YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT ...THIS GROUP AROUND FRANCK IN CHICAGO...DID THEY ACTUALLY MAKE A PROTEST OR A PETITION OR SOMETHING?

GROVES: AT THAT TIME...SHORTLY BEFORE...THERE WAS ANOTHER ANGLE TO THIS, AND THAT IS THAT THERE WAS A GROUP THAT WAS NOT TOO MUCH OCCUPIED AT THE TIME. THAT GROUP WAS CENTERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. IT WAS A GROUP WHICH HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC DETAILS ON WHICH THE DUPONT COMPANY DESIGNED AND BUILT THE PLUTONIUM PLANT AT HANFORD, WASHINGTON, AND THESE MEN HAD BEEN KEPT ON HAND BECAUSE WE MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING COME UP AND WE WANTED TO HAVE OUR PEOPLE RIGHT THERE IN CASE WE DID HAVE TROUBLE, AND ON ONE OCCASION WHEN THERE WAS A LITTLE SCIENTIFIC TROUBLE WE HAD THAT GROUP THERE AND IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE THEM AVAILABLE, BUT THEY WERE NOT AS BUSY AS THE OTHERS. THEY HAD

Franck - Szilard group were inactive at the time

they had time
to engage in
academic
discussions"

GROVES'
position
- had to save
lives

TIME TO ENGAGE IN WHAT MIGHT BE PROPERLY TERMED ACADEMIC DISCUSSIONS, AND THEY STARTED TO PONDER ON WHETHER IT WAS WRONG TO USE THE BOMB IN TIME OF WAR. PERSONALLY, OF COURSE, I HAD NO DECISION POWER IN THE MATTER. THAT WAS A MATTER TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. AS TO MY OWN POSITION, IT WAS NEVER IN DOUBT...AND THAT WAS THAT THERE WAS A WAR ON: THE MISSION THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ME BY SECRETARY STIMSON HAD BEEN TO--THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END SOONER THAN IT WOULD OTHERWISE BE ENDED AND THUS TO SAVE AMERICAN LIVES. NO OFFICER COULD POSSIBLY START TO WONDER...SHOULD WE USE THE WEAPON IF WE HAVE IT UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS? WE WERE LOSING ABOUT 250 MEN A DAY IN THE PACIFIC. THE ESTIMATED CASUALTIES FOR LANDING ON JAPANESE SHORES WOULD RUN ANYWHERE FROM 250,000 TO 1,000,000 MEN, AND I DID NOT FEEL THAT IT WAS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN ACADEMIC QUESTION. IT WAS A VERY SERIOUS QUESTION: SHOULD WE GO ON WITH THE WAR AND FACE THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS WHO WERE SUBJECTED TO UNNECESSARY DANGER; TO FACE THE FAMILIES OF ALL OF THOSE WHO WERE KILLED AFTER WE COULD HAVE STOPPED THE WAR...AND I DIDN'T SEE HOW THAT COULD BE DONE. AS I SAY, THE PEOPLE WHO FIRST STARTED TO TALK AGAINST THE USE OF THE BOMB OR HAVING A DEMONSTRATION OR SOMETHING ELSE DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE THE SAME REGARD FOR THE LIVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS THAT I HAD.

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, WHAT WERE THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DEMONSTRATION?

GROVES: THE REASON THAT WE DID NOT WANT A DEMONSTRATION WAS FIRST THAT IT COMPLETELY WIPED OUT ANY SURPRISE ELEMENT, AND THE SURPRISE ELEMENT, IN MY OPINION, WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT,

WHY NOT A
DEMONSTRATION

1) surprise

AND AS IT TURNED OUT, THAT IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY JAPAN SURRENDERED SO QUICKLY. THEY WEREN'T PREPARED FOR IT; IT WAS A BOLT OUT OF HEAVEN. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A SURPRISE TO EQUAL IT SINCE THE TROJAN HORSE, AND YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPENED THEN. AND THE BIG THING THAT WAS OVERLOOKED BY THE OBJECTORS WAS THE EFFECT OF SURPRISE. ALSO, IF WE HAD HAD A DEMONSTRATION OR WARNING, THEN WHENEVER WE DID... IF THE WARNING HAD NO EFFECT AND I DON'T THINK THAT IT WOULD HAVE... THEN THE PLANE THAT CARRIED THE BOMB OVER WOULD HAVE BEEN--IT WOULDN'T HAVE GOTTEN THERE PROBABLY. THE JAPANESE WOULD HAVE TAKEN EVERY EFFORT... MADE EVERY EFFORT TO SEE THAT THAT PLANE WAS BROUGHT DOWN AND IT WOULD HAVE INCREASED THE HAZARDS TO THE MEN THAT WERE CARRYING THE BOMB MANY, MANYFOLD. I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO REALIZE THAT IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY SURPRISE WHICH AS I SAY JUST DROVE JAPAN OUT OF THE WAR IN A HURRY. NOW WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE DONE IF THEY HAD HAD A CHANCE TO TALK, NOBODY KNOWS. OF COURSE, THE THEORY HAS COME UP SINCE THE WAR BY PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT GOING TO BE IN COMBAT OR WERE NOT GOING TO HAVE CLOSE RELATIVES IN COMBAT--THE ARGUMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP THAT JAPAN WAS ALREADY TO QUIT ANYWAY, THAT THEY WANTED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WAR. WELL, ANYONE WHO KNEW THE BACKGROUND OF MILITARY HISTORY, KNEW THAT THAT WAS ALWAYS THE CASE. IF WE THINK BACK TO WORLD WAR I, IN LATE 1914, THE KAISER STARTED TALKING ABOUT... WELL, LET'S HAVE PEACE NOW. THAT WENT ON THROUGHOUT THE WAR, AND ALSO AT THE TAIL END OF THAT WAR, AS IN ALL OTHER BIG WARS, THERE WAS THIS DESPERATE SURGE IN WORLD WAR I THAT WAS THE BIG HINDENBURG-GUTENDORF DRIVE IN 1918. IN WORLD WAR II IT WAS THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE AND IN OUR OWN CIVIL

2) no one knows what Japanese would have done if had chance to talk might not have quit

WAR IT WAS THE CONTINUED FIGHTING OF THE SOUTHERN TROOPS
 LONG AFTER LEE AND HIS OTHER PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE MEN IN
 THE RANKS, KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF VICTORY, BUT
 THEY STILL KEPT ON FIGHTING AND THERE WERE THOUSANDS AND
 THOUSANDS OF MEN LOST. AND YET YOU COULD SAY TODAY: WELL,
 NOW WHY DIDN'T THEY MAKE PEACE? PEOPLE DON'T GIVE UP THAT
 EASILY AND THAT IS PARTICULARLY TRUE TODAY WITH THE EXPERIENCE
 SHOWN TO THE WORLD BY WORLD WAR I WHEN A DEFEATED NATION
 WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND THE JAPS WERE FACED WITH THAT.
 WE HAD DECLARED OPENLY THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW THE MORGANTHAU
 PLAN IN GENERAL WHICH WAS TO REDUCE THE NATIONS THAT WERE
 DEFEATED TO A...WELL, JUST SORT OF PASTORAL COUNTRY. OF
 COURSE, IT DIDN'T TURN OUT THAT WAY BUT THERE WAS EVERY
 REASON FOR THE ENEMY TO FEEL THAT THAT WOULD HAPPEN. TO
 HAVE A DEMONSTRATION WOULD HAVE TAKEN MONTHS OF EFFORT TO
 DO IT; WE WOULD HAVE HAD A TERRIFIC ARGUMENT IN THIS COUNTRY;
 WE WOULD HAVE BEEN OUT IN THE OPEN, AND THERE WOULD HAVE
 BEEN MANY, MANY QUESTIONS--WE WOULD HAVE HAD THE PROBLEM TO
 FACE OF THE VARIOUS SCIENTIFIC PEOPLE WHO WOULD HAVE SAID:
 "I DON'T THINK THAT BOMB IS WELL DESIGNED. WHY DON'T WE
 GET MORE POWER OUT OF IT?" AND ALL OF THE THINGS THAT HAD
 NO BEARING ON THE REAL AFFAIR WAS HOW CAN WE BRING THIS
 WAR TO AN END AND SAVE AMERICAN LIVES? I THINK THAT GIVES
 A FAIRLY GOOD PICTURE OF WHAT WENT ON AT THAT TIME.

*3) demonstration
 would have taken
 months*

FREED:

I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU NEXT TO TALK A LITTLE ABOUT YOUR
 WORK IN CHARGE OF THE TARGET COMMITTEE WHICH CHOSE THE TAR-
 GET CITIES. COULD YOU TELL US ABOUT A CHOICE OF TARGETS;
 THE TARGET COMMITTEE WHICH YOU SELECTED AND THEIR REPORT
 BACK TO YOU ON THE CHOICE OF TARGETS?

GROVES:

THE SELECTION OF TARGETS AND THE WHOLE MILITARY OPERATION
 CAME TO ME AS A BIT OF A SURPRISE. INITIALLY, WHEN I WAS

ATOMIC BOMB
SND 1

ASSIGNED TO THE PROJECT, I WAS TOLD THAT ALL I HAD TO DO WAS TO TAKE SOME KNOWN SCIENTIFIC FACTS; TO TRANSLATE THOSE INTO BLUEPRINTS, BUILD THE PLANTS, STAFF THE PLANTS, OPERATE THEM FOR A FEW DAYS, AND THE WAR WOULD BE OVER. NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT ALL OF THE OTHER THINGS THAT I FINALLY HAD TO DO. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THERE WERE NO SCIENTIFIC FACTS. THERE WERE A FEW THEORIES AND THE THEORIES WEREN'T TOO GOOD IN MANY CASES. THE FUNDAMENTAL THEORY WAS CORRECT THAT WE COULD HAVE NUCLEAR FISSION, SO WE HAD TO START FROM SCRATCH. WE BUILT ALL THE WAY THROUGH, BUT VARIOUS THINGS WERE ADDED ON TO MY RESPONSIBILITY SUCH AS THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OF THE GERMAN EFFORTS; THE HANDLING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES...AND EVERYTHING...AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE AFTER THE WAR SO THAT WE WOULDN'T BE LEFT WITH NO SUPPLIES OF URANIUM, AND THE HANDLING OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN THIS COUNTRY WHICH ORIGINALLY I HAD DONE FOR ME IN ANOTHER AGENCY IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT. FINALLY, AT A CERTAIN PERIOD; I THINK IT WAS EARLY IN 1945, I TOLD GENERAL MARSHALL ON THE OCCASION OF A DISCUSSION WITH HIM ABOUT SOME OTHER MATTER THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS TIME TO START THE PLANNING FOR THE ACTUAL MILITARY OPERATION. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HIM DESIGNATE TWO OFFICERS IN THE OPERATIONS DIVISION OF THE GENERAL STAFF THAT I COULD TALK TO AND GET THEM STARTED ON MAKING THEIR PLANS. VERY MUCH TO MY SURPRISE, GENERAL MARSHALL SAID AFTER A MOMENTS THOUGHT—HE SAID, "IS THERE ANY REASON WHY YOU CAN'T DO THAT YOURSELF?" MY REPLY WAS: "NO SIR," THOSE WERE THE INSTRUCTIONS I HAD AND THE ONLY INSTRUCTIONS I HAD ABOUT FORMULATING THE WAR PLAN. I KNOW WHY HE WANTED THAT. IT WAS BECAUSE—FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, HE DIDN'T WANT TO BRING ANY

*General Graves
assigned to select
target committee*

OTHER PEOPLE INTO IT--AND SECOND: I THINK HE REALIZED THAT I COULD DO IT WITH A LOT LESS INTERFERENCE OF MY OWN OTHER ACTIVITIES--DO IT MYSELF INSTEAD OF TRYING TO ARGUE AND EXPLAIN TO THE OTHER PEOPLE HOW IT SHOULD BE DONE. I THINK THAT WAS POSSIBLY THE FIRST USE OF THE EXPRESSION: "I'D RATHER DO IT MYSELF, MOTHER." --AND NOT FOR INCLUSION IN THIS FILM, I HOPE. ANYWAY, HAVING THAT DIRECTIVE FROM GENERAL MARSHALL TO TAKE CHARGE OF THIS, I THEN TALKED TO GENERAL ARNOLD, THE CHIEF OF AIR FORCE ABOUT IT AND TOLD HIM THAT I WANTED SOME ADVICE FROM SOME OF HIS OFFICERS; GENERAL NORSTADT WHO WAS THEN CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE WHICH WAS A BIG BOMBING COMMAND UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF GENERAL ARNOLD WAS ASSIGNED TO ASSIST ME IN THAT WAY. I APPOINTED A TARGET COMMITTEE TO SURVEY THE FIELD SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TARGETS IN JAPAN AND SO THAT EVERYTHING WOULD BE READY AT THE TIME THAT WE NEEDED TO BE READY. OF COURSE, THE TARGET COMMITTEE WAS GIVEN DEFINITE INSTRUCTIONS BY ME AS TO WHAT WE WANTED. WE WANTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FIRST CITY TO BE BOMBED--WE WANTED IT TO BE BIG ENOUGH SO THAT THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMB WOULD RUN OUT--THAT IT WOULDN'T BE A SMALL SPOT OUT ON THE DESERT THAT YOU WOULDN'T KNOW WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE. WE ALSO WANTED OTHER REQUIREMENTS: IT HAD TO BE A MILITARY OBJECTIVE, IT HAD TO HAVE A DIRECT EFFECT ON THE WAR IF IT WAS DESTROYED; AND THERE WERE CERTAIN CITIES IN PARTICULAR THAT WE WANTED TO DESTROY SO THAT WE COULD CUT OFF THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE FORCES IN ASIA. THE COMMITTEE MET FIRST WITH GENERAL NORSTADT AND MYSELF. WE GAVE THEM A FEW POINTERS AND THEN THE COMMITTEE WAS TURNED LOOSE. LIKE ALL COMMITTEES THAT I HAD--AND I DIDN'T HAVE TOO MANY--I KEPT

GRAVES picks
+ instructs target
committee

*target
committee meet
& picks target
& makes
report*

VERY CLOSE TRACK OF THEM. MY DEPUTY, GENERAL FARRELL,
WAS A DIRECT REPRESENTATIVE OF MINE ON THE COMMITTEE. THE
COMMITTEE MET IN WASHINGTON. IT HAD EXPERTS FROM THE AIR
FORCE. AFTER THE DISCUSSIONS THERE, IT WENT OUT TO LOS
ALAMOS AND TALKED TO THE SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL THERE. I
WAS KEPT IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH IT AND WAS FULLY AWARE OF
WHAT THEY WERE GOING TO RECOMMEND AND APPROVE THEIR RECOM-
MENDATIONS IN ADVANCE. THE BATTLE PLAN WAS THEN DRAWN UP,
THE OPERATIONS PLAN. UNLIKE MOST SUCH PLANS IT WAS VERY
BRIEF. IT INCLUDED AN ORDER, A DRAFT OF AN ORDER, WHICH
WAS ABOUT A PAGE LONG. IT INCLUDED A DESCRIPTION OF EACH
ONE OF THE POTENTIAL TARGETS OF ABOUT A PAGE AND A HALF...
WITH THE REASONING WHY THESE TARGETS WERE SELECTED AND IN-
CLUDED A MAP OF JAPAN THAT WAS CUT OUT OF AN OLD MAGAZINE.
IT WAS ABOUT THIS SQUARE, BUT IT WAS VERY CLEAR AND WE UNDER-
LINED THE CITIES THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT. IT WAS A PLAN
THAT ANYONE COULD READ OVER IN ABOUT 10 MINUTES AND UNDER-
STAND WHAT IT WAS ABOUT. THIS PLAN WAS PRESENTED BY ME TO
SECRETARY STIMSON. I HAD WANTED TO PRESENT IT TO GENERAL
MARSHALL BUT MR. STIMSON SAID HE WANTED TO SEE IT FIRST.

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, WILL YOU TELL US IN DETAIL ABOUT YOUR CONVERSATION WITH MR. STIMSON ABOUT THE TARGET THAT STARTED WITH THE TIME YOU WENT OVER...

GROVES: IN CONNECTION WITH THE SELECTION OF TARGETS, THERE WAS A RATHER INTERESTING SUCCESSION OF EVENTS AND IN TALKING ABOUT THIS, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU THINK THROUGHOUT OF THE ILLUSTRATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND MYSELF AND PARTICULARLY OF THE GREAT QUALITIES OF SECRETARY STIMSON THAT HAVE NOT BEEN REPEATED VERY OFTEN IN OUR HIGHER GOVERNMENT IN THIS COUNTRY AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TOP CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE MILITARY. I WAS OVER IN MR. STIMSON'S OFFICE TALKING TO HIM ABOUT SOME MATTER IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMB WHEN HE ASKED ME IF I HAD SELECTED THE TARGETS YET. I REPLIED THAT I HAD THAT REPORT ALL READY AND I EXPECTED TO TAKE IT OVER TO GENERAL MARSHALL THE FOLLOWING MORNING FOR HIS CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL. MR. STIMSON THEN SAID, "WELL, YOUR REPORT IS ALL FINISHED, ISN'T IT?" I SAID, "I HAVEN'T GONE OVER IT YET, MR. STIMSON. I WANT TO BE SURE THAT I'VE GOT IT JUST RIGHT." HE SAID, "WELL, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT," AND I SAID, "WELL, IT'S ACROSS THE RIVER AND IT WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO GET IT." HE SAID, "I HAVE ALL DAY AND I KNOW HOW FAST YOUR OFFICE OPERATES. HERE'S A PHONE ON THIS DESK. YOU PICK IT UP AND YOU CALL YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE THEM BRING THAT REPORT OVER." WELL, IT TOOK ABOUT 15 TO 20 MINUTES TO GET THAT REPORT THERE, AND ALL THE TIME I WAS STEWING AND FRETTING INTERNALLY OVER THE FACT THAT I WAS SHORTCUTTING GENERAL MARSHALL. MY RELATIONSHIPS HAD BEEN RATHER PECULIAR FOR AN ARMY OFFICER. I REPORTED DIRECTLY TO TWO PEOPLE,

GROVES
shows target
committee report
to STIMSON

THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE SECRETARY OF WAR. I
REPORTED TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF ANYTHING I THOUGHT THAT
WAS OF INTEREST TO HIM FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT. I
REPORTED TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR ON ANYTHING ELSE, BUT
PRIMARILY ON WHAT WOULD BE ITS POST-WAR EFFECTS OR ANY
POLITICAL EFFECTS DURING THE WAR. SO, ANYONE WHO HAD
BEEN IN THE ARMY AS LONG AS I HAD BEEN DIDN'T HAVE TO
THINK ABOUT THE SPOT THAT I WAS IN, AND I THINK ANYONE
WHO'S HAD MUCH LESS SERVICE WOULD HAVE HAD THE SAME
FEELING. YOU DON'T WANT TO BE PUT INTO A POSITION WHERE
YOU'RE SHORT CUTTING YOUR MILITARY SUPERIOR. IT JUST
ISN'T WISE. BUT THERE WAS NOTHING I COULD DO AND WHEN I
PROTESTED SLIGHTLY THAT I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS SOMETHING
THAT GENERAL MARSHALL SHOULD PASS ON FIRST, MR. STIMSON
SAID, "THIS IS ONE TIME THAT I'M GOING TO BE THE FINAL
DECIDING AUTHORITY. NOBODY'S GOING TO TELL ME WHAT TO
DO ON THIS." HE SAID, "ON THIS MATTER I AM THE KINGPIN
AND YOU MIGHT JUST AS WELL GET THAT REPORT OVER HERE."
WELL, IN THE MEANTIME HE ASKED ME WHAT CITIES I WAS PLANNING
ON BOMBING, OR WHAT TARGETS. I INFORMED HIM AND TOLD HIM
THAT KYOTO WAS THE PREFERRED TARGET. IT WAS THE FIRST ONE
BECAUSE IT WAS OF SUCH SIZE THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO QUESTION
ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMB. ALSO, I POINTED OUT THAT
IT WAS A CITY OF CONSIDERABLE SIZE AND THAT IN JAPAN EVERY
HOUSEHOLD WAS ENGAGED IN WAR MANUFACTURE. HE IMMEDIATELY
SAID, " I DON'T WANT KYOTO BOMBED." AND HE WENT ON TO TELL
ME ABOUT ITS LONG HISTORY AS A CULTURAL CENTER OF JAPAN,
THE FORMER ANCIENT CAPITAL AND A GREAT MANY REASONS WHY HE
DIDN'T WANT TO SEE IT BOMBED. WHEN THE REPORT CAME OVER

*Kyoto is
ruled out by
STIMSON*

ATOM BOMB
SND 2

AND I HANDED IT TO HIM AND HE REALLY...HIS MIND WAS MADE UP AS SOON AS HE HEARD THE WORD KYOTO. THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. AFTER HE GOT THE REPORT, HE READ IT OVER AND HE WALKED OVER TO THE DOOR SEPARATING HIS OFFICE FROM GENERAL MARSHALL'S, OPENED IT AND SAID, "GENERAL MARSHALL, IF YOU'RE NOT BUSY, I WISH YOU'D COME IN." AND THEN THE SECRETARY REALLY DOUBLE-CROSSED ME BECAUSE WITHOUT ANY EXPLANATION HE SAID TO GENERAL MARSHALL, "MARSHALL, GENERAL GROVES HAS JUST BROUGHT ME HIS REPORT ON THE PROPOSED TARGETS." HE SAID, "I DON'T LIKE IT. I DON'T LIKE THE USE OF KYOTO." WELL, THAT WAS THE FIRST GENERAL MARSHALL HAD EVEN SURMISED THAT I WAS READY WITH ANY SUCH PLAN AND I HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM THAT I WAS DOUBLE-CROSSED BY THE SECRETARY, BUT NEVER DURING THE CONVERSATION DID GENERAL MARSHALL INDICATE ANY DISPLEASURE. HE NEVER SPOKE TO ME ABOUT IT AFTERWARDS AND I WASN'T GOING TO BRING UP THE SUBJECT. IF HE HAD BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT, I WOULD HAVE SAID, "WELL, GENERAL, I WAS JUST CAUGHT AND THERE WAS NOTHING I COULD DO. I FOUGHT DESPERATELY BUT I LOST OUT TO THE SECRETARY." BUT I THINK IT ILLUSTRATED THE TYPE OF MAN GENERAL MARSHALL WAS BETTER THAN ALMOST ANYTHING ELSE I EVER HEARD ABOUT HIM-- I THINK HE KNEW AUTOMATICALLY THAT I HAD BEEN CAUGHT AND HE DIDN'T CONSIDER IT WORTH BOTHERING ABOUT TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT IT. SECRETARY STIMSON, ON THE OTHER HAND, INSISTED THAT KYOTO BE LEFT OUT. I THINK THAT FROM THAT TIME ON UNTIL HE LEFT FOR POTSDAM FOR THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE, I MUST HAVE SEEN HIM A HALF DOZEN TIMES TO A DOZEN TIMES. ON EACH

STIMSON vs
GROVES in re
Kyoto

OCCASION I ASKED HIM TO RECONSIDER ON KYOTO AND ON
EACH OCCASION HE TOLD ME NO. AFTER HE WAS IN POTSDAM,
HE HAD MADE ARRANGEMENTS WHEN HE WENT TO POTSDAM FOR ME
TO HAVE DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH HIM AND HE HAD DONE
THAT BY APPOINTING A CIVILIAN ASSISTANT IN TEMPORARY
CHARGE OF THIS WORK WHILE HE WAS AWAY. THE PURPOSE WAS
SO THAT I COULD SEND DIRECT MESSAGES TO STIMSON WITHOUT
HAVING THEM GO THROUGH THE NORMAL STAFF CHANNELS WHERE
EVERYBODY WOULD START TO WONDER. "WHAT IN THE WORLD IS
HE DOING SENDING MESSAGES DIRECT TO THE SECRETARY OF
WAR. IT JUST ISN'T DONE." ANYWAY, IN THE COURSE OF THE
TIME THAT HE WAS IN POTSDAM, WE SENT HIM A MESSAGE ON DAY
SAYING THAT I STILL FELT THAT WE SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO USE
KYOTO. I GOT AN ANSWER BACK ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THAT HE
STILL DISAPPROVED. THEN WE GOT A CABLE THE NEXT DAY SAYING
THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED IT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESI-
DENT AGREED WITH HIM. BY THAT TIME IT WAS ALMOST TIME FOR
THE ACTUAL BOMBING ORDER TO BE ISSUED AND THAT WAS THE END
OF MY DISCUSSION WITH MR. STIMSON ON IT UNTIL AFTER THE
WAR WITH THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN COMING SO QUICKLY I TOLD
MR. STIMSON THAT I WAS VERY GLAD THAT HE HAD OVERRULED ME--
THAT I STILL FELT THAT I WAS RIGHT IN MY RECOMMENDATION BUT
AS THINGS TURNED OUT, HE WAS MUCH WISER THAN I HAD BEEN. I
THINK THAT THAT IS THE COMMENTARY ON THE CHARACTER OF STIM-
SON AND GENERAL MARSHALL--I THINK THEY ARE BETTER SHOWN BY
THIS STORY THAN ALMOST ANYTHING THAT I HAVE EVER HEARD OF.

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, WHY WAS HIROSHIMA CHOSEN?

GROVES: JUST A MINUTE, DO YOU WANT TO CALL IT HIROSHIMA OR HIROSHIMA?

FREED: HIROSHIMA...I THINK

GROVES: THERE'S A LOT OF ARGUMENT ON THAT. WELL, WHATEVER YOU'RE

USING.

FREED: HIROSHIMA.

GROVES: I'LL TRY TO KEEP IT THAT WAY. IF I MAKE A MISTAKE, ASK ME AND I'LL CORRECT IT. HIROSHIMA WAS THE FIRST CHOICE AS A TARGET AFTER KYOTO. HIROSHIMA WAS THE EMBARKATION CENTER FOR ALL TROOPS AND ALL SUPPLIES GOING FROM THE MAIN ISLAND OF HONSHU TO THE ISLAND OF KYUSHU, WHERE THE FIRST AMERICAN LANDING WAS TO BE MADE. THERE WERE A GREAT MANY TROOPS THERE. THERE WAS AN ARMY HEADQUARTERS. I THINK THERE WERE ABOUT 25,000 JAPANESE TROOPS IN THIS ARMY HEADQUARTERS. THE CITY WAS A CENTRAL PORT CITY, AS I SAID SUPPLYING EVERYTHING TO THE SOUTH AND THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF INDUSTRY IN IT AS WELL. IT WAS OF SUFFICIENT SIZE ALTHOUGH NOT QUITE BIG ENOUGH FOR OUR TARGET EFFECTS TO RUN OUT. THE AIMING POINT SELECTED WAS THE JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS AND THE BEST REPORTS THAT WE COULD GET--THAT OUT OF THE 25,000 MEN, THERE WERE AT LEAST 15,000 SOLDIERS KILLED AT THE BOMBING. THERE WERE ABOUT 5,000 APPARENTLY WOUNDED AND THERE WERE 5,000 WHO ESCAPED UNHARMED, MOST OF WHOM WERE OFF-DUTY AT THE TIME. THAT WAS CERTAINLY AS MILITARY A TARGET AS YOU COULD GET AND IT WAS A KEY CITY. IT MEANT IMMEDIATELY THAT ANY ATTEMPTS TO HANDLE AN INVASION OF KYUSHU WOULD HAVE BEEN RENDERED VERY DIFFICULT TO THE JAPANESE, IF THEY HAD WANTED TO CONTINUE THE WAR AFTER THAT. I THINK THAT'S THE BASIS OF THAT SELECTION.

*choice of
HIROSHIMA
WHY*

ATOMIC BOMB
 GENERAL GROVES
 ROLL 2 SND 3

FREED:

GENERAL GROVES, YOU WERE TELLING US ABOUT THE FACT THAT TOKYO HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AS A TARGET AND WAS RULED OUT. WOULD YOU TELL US ABOUT THAT?

GROVES:

AT THE TIME THE ORIGINAL TARGETS WERE SELECTED, I DID NOT WISH TO SELECT TOO MANY. I FELT THAT FOUR WAS THE RIGHT NUMBER TO SELECT INITIALLY BECAUSE THEN, BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE GAINED IN THE FOUR, IF WE HAD TO USE MORE THAN TWO, WE WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO NEXT. AND DON'T FORGET THAT I HAD HELD FOR SOME TIME TO THE OPINION THAT TWO BOMBS WOULD END THE WAR SO THAT WE DIDN'T NEED MORE THAN TWO TARGETS, EXCEPTING WE DID NEED ALTERNATE TARGETS BECAUSE WEATHER CONDITIONS MIGHT HAVE BEEN SUCH THAT A PARTICULAR TARGET WAS CLOUDED OR FOGGED IN SOME WAY OR SMOKED IN SO THAT WE NEEDED MORE THAN ONE TARGET WHEN THE PLANE TOOK OFF. SO I DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD HAVE FOUR TARGETS INITIALLY AND AT THE FIRST SELECTION OF TARGETS WE DID NOT INCLUDE NAGASAKI. WHEN KYOTO WAS RULED OUT, WE ADDED NAGASAKI BEFORE THE ACTUAL OPERATION STARTED. CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO TOKYO, OF COURSE. CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO EVERY SUITABLE TARGET IN JAPAN. TOKYO, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO ^{NAPALM} ~~NAPALM~~ BOMBING OF THE AIR FORCE THAT HAD KNOCKED OUT GREAT SECTIONS OF TOKYO BUT THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE SECTIONS LEFT AND MY DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY STIMSON ON WHAT HE TERMED THE FUTURE HISTORICAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND WHICH WAS THE BASIS ON WHICH HE HAD TURNED DOWN KYOTO LED ME TO THE BELIEF THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR US TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BOMBING EFFECT THAT WOULD DESTROY THE IMPERIAL PALACE OF THE EMPEROR. I WAS

GROVES felt
 2 bombs enough -
 why Nagasaki
 a other cities on
 list

why stimson
 opposed putting
 Tokyo on the
 list

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

CONVINCED FROM MY TALKS WITH SECRETARY STIMSON THAT THE EMPEROR AND WITH THE FORMER AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN, MR. GREW, THEN UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, THAT THE EMPEROR WAS MORE THAN A SYMBOL IN JAPAN. HE WAS THE MAN ABOUT WHOM THE REGENERATION OF JAPAN DEPENDED...AS YOU MIGHT SAY AS A SYMBOL BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE TERRIFIC ...NOT ONLY THE PRESTIGE HE HAD BUT THE TERRIFIC POWER THAT HE HAD WHEN HE FELT THAT HE HAD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT POWER. IT SEEMED UNWISE TO ME TO USE TOKYO. AFTER WE BOMBED HIROSHIMA AND POSSIBLY AFTER THE BOMBING OF NAGASAKI, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT BELIEVE SO, I RECEIVED A CABLE FROM GENERAL SPAATZ WHO WAS THE FIELD COMMANDER BY THAT TIME OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE BASED IN GUAM OF WHICH THE SPECIAL BOMBING GROUP FORMED A PART. AND-- AS ALL MILITARY ORDERS ARE WRITTEN--MINE THAT WAS SIGNED BY GENERAL MARSHALL WAS A DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE. GENERAL SPAATZ THEN HAD TO CARRY OUT THE DETAILS OF THAT. VERY FEW DETAILS WERE INCLUDED IN THE GENERAL DIRECTIVE. AFTER ALL, YOU CAN'T INCLUDE TOO MUCH ON ONE PAGE AND THE ONLY THINGS THAT WERE ON THAT WERE THE THINGS THAT NORMALLY WERE EXTREMELY EXCEPTIONAL AND THAT NORMALLY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INCLUDED. THERE WERE SUCH THINGS AS THE FACT THAT NO ONE WAS TO MAKE ANY COMMENT ON THIS BOMBING IN THE FIELD WITHOUT CLEARANCE FROM WASHINGTON. THE REASON FOR THAT WAS SO THAT WE WOULDN'T HAVE ANY EMBARRASSING STATEMENTS BLURTLED OUT BY SOMEONE WHO REGRETTED THAT ADMIRAL HALSEY WASN'T GOING TO BE ABLE TO RIDE DOWN THE STREETS OF TOKYO ON HIS

*the bombing
order*

*no one allowed
to comment
without clearance*

WHITE HORSE AND THINGS OF THAT KIND. YOU NEVER KNOW
JUST WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN AND THIS WAS A BRAND NEW
AFFAIR AND WE JUST HAD TO HAVE A CONTROL OVER WHAT WAS
SAID. GENERAL SPAATZ DID SUGGEST AND ASK FOR ADDITIONAL
 TARGETS TO BE ADDED AND TOKYO WAS ONE OF THE PLACES HE
 PROPOSED AS AN ADDITIONAL TARGET. THAT WAS NOT APPROVED
 BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NEED TO BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZED THAT
 THE WAR WAS COMING SO CLOSE TO AN END THAT WE DID NOT
 FEEL THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH MORE ATOMIC BOMBING IF ANY.

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, COULD WE GO BACK FOR A MINUTE. YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR BOOK THAT JUST BEFORE THE YALTA CONFERENCE THAT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT SAID IF WE HAD BOMBS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN WAR WAS OVER HE WOULD LIKE TO DROP THEM ON GERMANY. WOULD YOU DISCUSS THIS?

GROVES: AT THE CONFERENCE THAT SECRETARY STIMSON AND MYSELF HAD
WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT JUST SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE,
I BELIEVE IT WAS DECEMBER 30TH OR 31ST OF 1944, PRESIDENT
ROOSEVELT WAS QUITE DISTURBED OVER THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE
AND HE ASKED ME AT THAT TIME WHETHER I COULD BOMB GERMANY
AS WELL AS JAPAN. THE PLAN HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO BOMB JAPAN
BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THE WAR IN GERMANY WAS PRETTY APT TO BE
OVER IN THE FIRST PLACE AND IN THE SECOND PLACE THE JAPANESE
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION WAS MUCH MORE EASILY DAMAGED BY A
BOMB OF THIS CHARACTER THAN THAT IN GERMANY. I URGED PRESIDENT
ROOSEVELT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR VARIOUS
REASONS. THE MAIN ONE WAS THAT THE GERMANS HAD QUITE STRONG
AERIAL DEFENSE. THEY MADE A PRACTICE, AS EVERY NATION DOES,
THAT WHEN A NEW PLANE CAME INTO THE COMBAT AREA, THAT THEY

FDR asked about using bomb against Germany Dec 30, 1944

*why Japan, not Germany, target
 1) was easier to see
 2) kind of target*

Groves told FDR difficult to A bomb Germany

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

1) no B 29's
 2) preferable using
 British planes

WOULD RUN ANY RISK THAT THEY COULD TO BRING SUCH A
PLANE DOWN SO THAT THEY COULD EXAMINE IT AND SEE
WHAT NEW IDEAS HAD COME IN SO THAT THEY COULD MAKE
IMPROVEMENTS AND ALSO WOULD KNOW THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE PLANE SO THAT THEY COULD PREPARE A BETTER
DEFENSE AGAINST IT. WE HAD NO B-29'S IN EUROPE. IF
WE HAD SENT OVER A SMALL SQUADRON OR GROUP AS WE DID
AGAINST JAPAN OF THIS TYPE, EVERYONE OF THEM WOULD HAVE
BEEN BROUGHT DOWN ON THE FIRST TRIP TO GERMANY. IF THEY
HADN'T BEEN, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THROUGH NO LACK OF EFFORT
ON THE PART OF THE GERMANS. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO
BRING A LARGE NUMBER OF B-29'S OVER TO ENGLAND AND THAT
WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR LOGISTICAL TASK AND THE OTHER
POSSIBILITY WOULD HAVE BEEN TO HAVE USED A BRITISH PLANE
WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A BIT PLEASING TO GENERAL
ARNOLD AND ALSO WOULD HAVE CREATED A GREAT MANY DIFFICULTIES
FOR OUR GENERAL OPERATION BECAUSE THEN IT WOULD BE AN
ALLIED OPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES FURNISHING THE
BOMBS AND EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH IT BUT USING A BRITISH
PLANE AND A BRITISH CREW TO ACTUALLY DROP THE BOMB AND IT
WOULD HAVE RAISED A TREMENDOUS NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES.] AND
DIFFICULTIES LIKE THAT--WHILE YOU SAY YOU SHOULD BE ABLE
TO HANDLE THAT--YOU CAN BUT IN A PROJECT OF THIS CHARACTER
THERE ARE SO MANY LITTLE THINGS, EACH ONE OF THEM KEY, THAT
YOU CAN'T AFFORD TO THROW ANY MORE SAND INTO THE WHEELS
THAN YOU CAN HELP.

DIS:

(ASKING QUESTION REGARDING BOMBING OF GERMANY)

GROVES:

*A bomb being given
never seriously
considered*

THE BOMBING OF GERMANY WITH ATOMIC BOMBS WAS, I WOULD SAY, NEVER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED TO THE EXTENT OF MAKING DEFINITE PLANS BUT ON THIS OCCASION AFTER I TOLD THE PRESIDENT, MR. ROOSEVELT, WHY IT WOULD BE VERY UNFORTUNATE FROM MY STANDPOINT, I ADDED THAT OF COURSE IF THE PRESIDENT—IF THE WAR DEMANDED IT AND THE PRESIDENT SO DESIRED, WE WOULD BOMB GERMANY AND I WAS SO CERTAIN PERSONALLY THAT THE WAR IN EUROPE WOULD BE OVER BEFORE WE WOULD BE READY THAT YOU MIGHT SAY I DIDN'T GIVE IT TOO MUCH CONSIDERATION.

FREED:

WOULD YOU DISCUSS THE FIRST MEETING YOU HAD WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN--THAT, I BELIEVE, WAS ABOUT THE 25TH OF APRIL. AT THAT POINT YOU HAD JUST FOUND ABOUT...

GROVES:

*in FOR's death
GROVES prepares
report for Truman*

WHEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DIED, MY FIRST REACTION WAS TO PREPARE A REPORT FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT. IN FACT, I STARTED WORKING ON IT WITHIN TEN OR FIFTEEN MINUTES AFTER I GOT THE FLASH THAT ROOSEVELT HAD DIED. THIS WAS PREPARED IN THE FORM OF A MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR SO THAT WE COULD THEN HANDLE IT IN WHATEVER WAY THE NEW PRESIDENT WANTED TO HANDLE IT AND HOWEVER THE SECRETARY WANTED TO HANDLE IT. BOTH MR. STIMSON AND MYSELF AND I THINK GENERAL MARSHALL, TOO, FELT A LITTLE DIFFIDENT ABOUT THE SITUATION. THE REASON FOR THIS DIFFIDENCE WAS...IT WASN'T THE FACT THAT MR. TRUMAN DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT WE WERE DOING, BUT WHEN HE WAS IN THE SENATE BEFORE HE BECAME VICE-PRESIDENT, HE'D BEEN CHAIRMAN OF THE TRUMAN INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE. HE HAD TRIED TO HAVE HIS INVESTIGATORS...HE HAD ASKED TO HAVE HIS INVESTIGATORS LOOK INTO OUR PROJECT AND

*felt diffident
because Truman
had been barred
from A Bomb
information*

ATOMIC BOMB

SND #3

WE HAD TOLD HIM NO THAT THEY COULDN'T. THERE WAS A
LITTLE BIT OF DISCUSSION ABOUT IT AND THERE WAS A FEEL-
ING ON THE PART OF ALL THREE OF US, MR. STIMSON, GENERAL
MARSHALL AND MYSELF THAT MAYBE THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE
SOME RATHER SEVERE COMMENTS TO US ABOUT--"WELL, NOW I
WISH YOU HAD LET ME LOOK INTO THIS EARLIER. I'D HAVE KNOWN
A LOT MORE ABOUT IT. I'D HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED FOR
ANY OTHER NUMBER OF THINGS." BUT WHEN I WENT OVER THERE;
IN THE FIRST PLACE GENERAL MARSHALL DID NOT GO. HE SAID
THAT IT WOULD CREATE TOO MUCH PRESS INTEREST IF THE SEC-
RETARY AND HE AND I ALL WENT OVER THERE AND OF COURSE WE
DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER THE PRESS KNEW WHAT I WAS DOING OR NOT.
YOU COULDN'T TELL. WE KNEW THAT SOME HAD SOME INKLINGS,
BUT AS SOON AS I DID THAT I WOULD BE SPOTTED AND THEY
WOULD HAVE THEIR CURIOSITY AROUSED. THEY WOULD WANT TO
KNOW WHAT I WAS DOING AND ALL OF THAT. GENERAL MARSHALL
ALSO DECIDED THAT HE WOULDN'T GO. IT WOULD MAKE TOO MUCH
OF THE OCCASION SO MR. STIMSON WENT ALONE. I WAS SENT OVER
THROUGH THE BACK DOOR OF THE WHITE HOUSE, CAME IN THROUGH
THE OTHER ENTRANCE AND WOUND UP IN MISS GRACE TULLY'S
OFFICE WHERE I SAT AND WAITED UNTIL MR. STIMSON CAME INTO
THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE AND THEN I WAS USHERED IN.} OUR
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS MOST CORDIAL. WHEN MR. STIM-
SON STARTED TO INTRODUCE ME, THE NEW PRESIDENT SAID, "I'VE
KNOWN HIM SINCE 1936." SO THERE WAS NO PROBLEM THERE OF ANY
KIND. IT WAS A MOST PLEASANT MEETING. } MR. TRUMAN DID NOT
LIKE TO READ LONG REPORTS. THIS REPORT WAS NOT LONG...CON-
SIDERING THE SIZE OF THE PROJECT. IT WAS ABOUT 24 PAGES

*why Marshall
 didn't go
 - knew they
 acted to keep the
 meeting secret*

*knew they
 told Truman*

ATOMIC BOMB

END 3

AND HE WOULD CONSTANTLY INTERRUPT HIS READING TO SAY, "WHY, I DON'T LIKE TO READ PAPERS." AND MR. STIMSON WOULD REPLY, "WELL, WE CAN'T TELL YOU THIS IN ANY MORE CONCISE LANGUAGE. THIS IS A BIG PROJECT." FOR EXAMPLE: WE DISCUSSED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH IN ABOUT FOUR OR FIVE LINES. IT WAS THAT MUCH CONDENSED. WE HAD TO EXPLAIN ALL THE PROCESSES AND WE MIGHT JUST SAY WHAT THEY WERE AND THAT WAS ABOUT ALL. AFTER WE WERE THROUGH, THE PRESIDENT INDICATED HIS GREAT INTEREST AND HIS FEELING THAT IT WAS SOUND AND THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN OUR COURSE OF ACTION.

FREED:

GENERAL GROVES, IN YOUR BOOK YOU SAID: "THE INITIAL DECISION AND THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY WERE MR. TRUMAN'S. AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED, HIS DECISION WAS ONE OF NON-INTERFERENCE, BASICALLY A DECISION NOT TO UPSET THE EXISTING PLAN." WOULD YOU ENLARGE ON THAT A LITTLE?

GROVES:

THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A LOT OF DISCUSSION BY PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT TOO FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY OUR GOVERNMENT OPERATES ABOUT WHO MADE THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB. WELL, THAT DECISION WAS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT, MR. TRUMAN. IT COULDN'T BE MADE BY ANYONE ELSE. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE WEREN'T IN ACCORD WITH HIS DECISION. AS I PUT IT SOME TEN MONTHS BEFORE: I HAD SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT FAIL TO USE THIS BOMB BECAUSE IF THEY DIDN'T USE IT, THEY WOULD IMMEDIATELY CAST A LOT OF REFLECTION ON MR. ROOSEVELT AND ON THE BASIS THAT WHY DID YOU SPEND ALL THIS MONEY AND ALL THIS EFFORT AND THEN WHEN YOU GOT IT, WHY DIDN'T YOU USE IT? ALSO, IT WOULD HAVE COME OUT SOONER OR LATER IN A CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

*how decision
was made*

*why had to use
bomb*

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

IF NOWHERE ELSE JUST WHEN WE COULD HAVE DROPPED THE BOMB IF WE DIDN'T USE IT. AND THEN KNOWING AMERICAN POLITICS, YOU KNOW AS WELL AS I DO THAT THERE HAD BEEN ELECTIONS FOUGHT ON THE BASIS THAT EVERY MOTHER WHOSE SON WAS KILLED AFTER SUCH AND SUCH DATE--THE BLOOD WAS ON THE HEAD OF THE PRESIDENT AND YOU JUST CAN'T COMBAT THAT. BUT ABOVE ALL ELSE WAS THE VERY STRONG FEELING ON THE PART OF MR. TRUMAN WHICH WAS THE SAME FEELING THAT THE REST OF US HAD WHO KNEW ABOUT IT WAS THAT IT WAS CRIMINAL AND MORALLY WRONG FOR US TO HAVE MEANS TO BRING THIS WAR TO A PROPER CONCLUSION AND THEN NOT USE THE MEANS. AND I THINK THAT WAS THE BASIS OF IT. NOW IT IS TRUE THAT HERE WAS THIS GREAT PROJECT RUNNING AND IT WAS GOING...IT WAS A VERY LARGE AFFAIR AS YOU ALL KNOW, BUT IF MR. TRUMAN HAD SAID, "NO, WE DON'T WANT TO DROP THAT BOMB," THAT WOULD HAVE ENDED IT. WE MIGHT HAVE MADE A LOT OF PRIVATE COMMENTS BUT THE BOMB WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN DROPPED.

FREED:

GENERAL GROVES, I'VE READ IN SOME BOOKS AND I THINK YOU'RE IN A GOOD POSITION TO STRAIGHTEN THIS OUT FOR ME ONE WAY OR THE OTHER--INDICATIONS THAT ADMIRAL LEAHY, GENERAL MAC ARTHUR AND GENERAL EISENHOWER WERE OPPOSED TO DROPPING THE BOMB. WOULD YOU TELL US JUST WHAT THE FACTS...

GROVES:

ADMIRAL LEAHY WAS IN A PECULIAR POSITION. HE WAS CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT. THE ONLY TIME I TALKED TO HIM ABOUT THE BOMB WAS ON ONE OCCASION WHEN I TOOK OVER A REPORT THAT I HAD WRITTEN FOR THE BENEFIT PRIMARILY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OF WHICH HE WAS THE CHAIRMAN--OF THE GROUP.

ATOMIC BOMB

END 3

AND THE PURPOSE WAS TO INDICATE JUST WHEN THE ATOMIC BOMB WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AND THUS HOW WOULD THEY DO THEIR WAR PLANNING. I DIDN'T KNOW ADMIRAL LEAHY BUT HE KNEW MY DAUGHTER VERY WELL. SHE WAS A CLOSE FRIEND OF HIS GRANDDAUGHTER AND HE SAW A GREAT DEAL OF HER. THEY WERE THEN IN PREP SCHOOL IN WASHINGTON. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION HE TOLD ME: "YOU KNOW I HATE TO SEE YOU MIXED UP IN THIS. I KNEW ABOUT YOU AND KNEW ABOUT YOUR REPUTATION AND I JUST WISH YOU WERE ON SOMETHING ELSE, BECAUSE," HE SAID, "YOU KNOW, NO WEAPON HAS EVER HAD ANY EFFECT ON THE ENDING OF A WAR THAT WAS DEVELOPED DURING THAT WAR." AND HE TOOK THAT STAND, I THINK, RATHER GENERALLY. AT POTSDAM WHEN THE NEWS CAME FROM ME THAT OUR TEST AT ALMAGORDO HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND EVERYBODY REALIZED WHO WAS IN ON IT THAT THIS MEANT THE END OF THE WAR, PROVIDED THAT WE COULD GET ANOTHER ONE TO GO OFF, I BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF RATHER SHARP--YOU MIGHT SAY JUST PLAIN KIDDING OF ADMIRAL LEAHY BY CERTAIN OF THE SENIOR CIVILIANS UNDER MR. STIMSON AND THAT DID NOT SIT WELL WITH THE ADMIRAL. HE DIDN'T LIKE IT A BIT AND AFTER ALL, NOBODY WHO HAD BEEN AN ADMIRAL AS LONG AS HE HAD WOULD LIKE SUCH COMMENTS. ANYWAY, HE DID NOT--UNTIL AFTER THE WAR HE DID NOT EXPRESS ANY GREAT ANTIPATHY TO THE USE OF THE BOMB AS FAR AS IT WAS EVER REPORTED TO ME. HE WOULD NOT HAVE BROUGHT IT UP IN A MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE OTHER PEOPLE THERE, BUT HE HAD PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO GENERAL MARSHALL, ADMIRAL KING, GENERAL ARNOLD AND SECRETARY STIMSON

*Leahy feels
sorry for Groves
assigned to this
job*



*Leahy kidded
at Potsdam*

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

AS WELL AS TO THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE NEVER HAD THE SLIGHTEST INKLING THAT HE EVER SAID ANYTHING ABOUT IT. AS TO GENERAL MAC ARTHUR, HIS ATTITUDE WAS, I THINK, VERY CLEAR AND THAT WAS THAT THIS WAS A WAY TO END THE WAR AND IT WAS DONE AND THAT WAS ALL THERE WAS TO IT. HE, OF COURSE, KNEW THAT THE WAR WAS WON ALREADY. IT'S HARD TO SAY JUST WHEN A WAR IS WON. TO GO TO ONE THAT WE ALL UNDERSTAND, OUR OWN CIVIL WAR, WE ALL KNOW TODAY AND I THINK THEY KNEW THEN THAT AFTER THE CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG AND THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG THAT THE WAR WAS WON BUT THERE WERE AN AWFUL LOT OF MEN KILLED AFTERWARDS. MAC ARTHUR KNEW THAT HE HAD TO FACE THE LANDINGS ON THE BEACHES OF JAPAN AND HE, AS YOU ALL KNOW PARTICULARLY FROM WHAT'S BEEN WRITTEN OF HIM RECENTLY, THERE WAS NEVER A COMMANDER WHO WAS MORE CONSIDERATE OF THE LIVES OF HIS MEN THAN MAC ARTHUR WAS. HE TOOK IT AS, I THINK, A PERSONAL PRIDE IN HIS GENERALSHIP THAT ENABLED HIM TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES WITH A MINIMUM LOSS IN MEN. IN THE YEARS...I DIDN'T KNOW GENERAL MAC ARTHUR BEFORE THEN BUT I WAS VERY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH HIM IN BUSINESS IN THE REMINGTON RAND ORGANIZATION FOR ABOUT SIX YEARS. NEVER ONCE DID HE EVER SAY IN MY PRESENCE ANYTHING ABOUT THIS—HIS BEING OPPOSED TO IT OR NOT. HE MAY HAVE WRITTEN SOMETHING IN HIS BIOGRAPHY WHICH I HAVE NOT SEEN AS YET BUT I'D BE A LITTLE BIT SURPRISED IF HE HAD. I'M SURE THAT HE WOULD SAY THAT WE DIDN'T NEED THE BOMB TO WIN. THAT IS TRUE. YOU DIDN'T NEED IT TO WIN BUT YOU NEEDED IT TO SAVE AMERICAN LIVES. AS TO GENERAL EISENHOWER, HE OF COURSE ONLY WAS IN ON THE

hard to say
when a war is
won

MacArthur's
view

EISENHOWER

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

Eisenhower

FRINGES OF THIS AFFAIR. HE WAS TOLD OF ITS EXISTENCE OF A PROJECT RATHER EARLY AND BEFORE THE NORMANDY LANDING HE WAS INFORMED OF THE HAZARDS OF THE CHANCE, YOU MIGHT SAY, THAT THE GERMANS WOULD USE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SPREAD ON THE GROUND TO IMPEDE A LANDING, THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS INLAND AND HE WAS TOLD A GREAT DEAL AT THAT TIME OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS COULD BE DONE: IT WAS WELL WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMANS BUT THEY JUST DIDN'T KNOW ENOUGH TO DO IT AND THEY OPERATED TOO POORLY IN THEIR SCIENTIFIC CIRCLES TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING BUT IT WAS PERFECTLY WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES AS WE SAW THEM AND GENERAL EISENHOWER WAS INFORMED AT THAT TIME. SHORTLY BEFORE THE ACTUAL USE OF THE BOMBING, HE WAS TOLD OF IT BY SECRETARY STIMSON. HOW HE FELT PERSONALLY, I DON'T KNOW--AT THE TIME. I KNOW THIS THAT I DOUBT VERY MUCH IF ANY COMMANDER IN GERMANY WOULD HAVE PROTESTED. THEY WOULD HAVE TAKEN AS A MATTER OF INTEREST--SAID THEY DIDN'T UNDERSTAND ANYTHING ABOUT IT AND ALL OF THAT. (REMEMBER THIS THAT WHEN THE BOMB WAS USED, BEFORE IT WAS USED AND THE TIME THAT IT WAS USED, WE HAD NO BASIC CONCEPT OF THE DAMAGE THAT IT WOULD DO. WE THOUGHT IT WOULD DO A GREAT DEAL BUT WE DIDN'T KNOW AT THAT TIME WHETHER THE EXPLOSION MIGHT NOT BE A LITTLE TOO HIGH OR A LITTLE TOO LOW. WE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER THE FUSING WOULD WORK. THE BOMB USED OVER HIROSHIMA HAD NEVER BEEN TESTED. A LOT OF FEATURES HAD BEEN TESTED BUT ONLY THE GUN PART-- IT WAS A GUN TYPE BOMB WHERE THE PROJECTOR OF URANIUM WAS FIRED INTO A TARGET OF URANIUM. WE HAD NO REAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE THING WOULD WORK AND WE ALSO--THE FACT THAT THE

*when bomb used
they had no concept
of damage it would
do*

or if it would work

ATOMIC BOMB

END 3

BOMB HAD GONE OFF AT ALMAGORDO--THE IMPLOSION TYPE,
THE ONE THAT WAS USED AT NAGASAKI, WAS NO INDICATION
THAT THE SECOND ONE WOULD GO OFF. ALSO, THE FIRST ONE
WAS PUT UP ON A TOWER. IT HAD NONE OF THE MECHANISMS
THAT WERE NECESSARY TO SET IT OFF AT THE PROPER HEIGHT.
 THE ACTUAL FUSING OF CONTROL OF THE HEIGHT AT WHICH IT
 WOULD BE EXPLODED WAS TESTED IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT
 48 HOURS BEFORE IT WAS ACTUALLY USED OVER NAGASAKI. IT
 WAS TESTED OVER IN THE TINIAN AREA 24 HOURS AHEAD OF
 TIME. AND NOBODY COULD TELL JUST WHAT WAS GOING TO
HAPPEN AND PARTICULARLY WE COULDN'T TELL HOW SEVERE THE
EXPLOSION WOULD BE AND HOW MANY PEOPLE WOULD BE INJURED.
 WE ALSO HAD NO CONCEPT THAT THE JAPANESE REACTION TO SUCH
 A DISASTER WOULD BE AS CALM LOCALLY, AND WITHOUT ANYBODY
 COMING TO ASSIST AS WE WOULD HAVE DONE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN
 THE SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE MY CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER HAD
 BEEN A BOY AT THE TIME AND HE TOLD ME THAT WITHIN A FEW
 MINUTES AFTER THE BIG QUAKE, HIS FATHER HITCHED UP A TEAM
 AND SAID, "SOMETHING'S HAPPENED AND I'M DRIVING INTO OAK-
 LAND," WHICH WAS ABOUT FIFTEEN MILES AWAY. WHEREAS, IN
 HIROSHIMA SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE WOUNDED SAT AND NO-
 BODY EVEN PAID ANY ATTENTION TO THEM AS THEY WENT BY. THE
 STORY OF ONE OF THE GERMAN PRIESTS WHO WAS THERE WAS THAT
 HE PASSED THIS MAN SITTING ON THE CURBSTONE IN A LITTLE
 PARK: HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO RESCUE HIS FATHER SUPERIOR WHO
 WAS IN TOWN--ON THE WAY BACK TWO HOURS LATER THIS MAN WAS
 STILL SITTING THERE STILL UNATTENDED AND NOTHING HAD
 HAPPENED TO HIM. IT'S TRUE THAT ALL OF THE HOSPITALS WERE
GENERALLY DESTROYED AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS AND THINGS OF THAT

*a few Japanese
 would react*

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

KIND BUT THERE WASN'T THIS SURGING FORWARD THAT THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ACCUSTOMED TO IN THIS COUNTRY
AS A WHOLE.

FREED:

YOU WERE PRESENT AT THE MEETING OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE
ON MAY 31ST AND JUNE 1ST WHERE IT WAS DECIDED THAT THERE
WAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE THAN DROPPING THE BOMB ON A MILLI-
TARY TARGET. WILL YOU TELL US ABOUT THAT?

GROVES:

THE INTERIM COMMITTEE HAD A ROLE THAT HAS SORT OF BEEN
MISUNDERSTOOD, I THINK, SINCE THAT TIME. IT WAS ORIGINALLY
FORMED BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF MR.
STIMSON. IT HAD BEEN VERY CAREFULLY DISCUSSED BETWEEN MR.
STIMSON AND MYSELF. THE MEMBERSHIP HAD BEEN WORKED ON
UNTIL WE GOT WHAT WE THOUGHT WOULD BE A VERY FINE COMMITTEE.
WE EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT OF COURSE THE PRESIDENT
SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO—IF HE WANTED TO—TO PICK A MAN FOR
IT BUT OF COURSE HE COULD UPSET IT AND PICK ALL OF HIS OWN
PEOPLE BUT HE EVEN PICKED THE MAN THAT WE WANTED ON THERE
WHO WAS MR. BURNS. THE ROLE WITH THAT COMMITTEE WAS TO
DECIDE WHAT SHOULD BE THE ~~POST-WAR~~ POST-WAR COURSE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO LEGISLATION AND THE
RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON THE BOMB. IT WAS VERY CAREFULLY
MADE UP ENTIRELY OF CIVILIANS. ORIGINALLY, IN DISCUSSING
IT, MR. STIMSON HAD PROPOSED THAT I BE A MEMBER. LATER,
WE BOTH CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THAT WOULD BE MOST UN-
WISE—THAT WE SHOULD MAKE THIS A COMPLETELY CIVILIAN COM-
MITTEE SO THAT THERE COULD NEVER BE ANY THOUGHT THAT IT
WAS A MILITARY DECISION. IN THE COURSE OF THE OPERATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE IN THE PREPARATION OF THESE TWO THINGS,

GROVES a
STIMSON set
up INTERIM
committee

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

THE POSTWAR ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION, THE COMMITTEE WENT BEYOND THE ORIGINAL SCOPE AND QUITE PROPERLY SO. [I DO NOT HAVE IN MY MIND THE EXACT WORDING OF WHAT THE COMMITTEE WAS TO DO BUT AT ANY RATE IT GOT INTO THIS ROLE OF SHOULD THE BOMB BE USED AND HOW SHOULD IT BE USED FROM THE GENERAL OVERALL POLICY ANGLE.

Committee got into discussion of how to use the bomb

THIS WAS PERFECTLY AGREEABLE—TAKING OVER THIS ROLE WAS PERFECTLY AGREEABLE TO BOTH MR. STIMSON AND MYSELF BECAUSE

WE REALIZED THAT NOBODY COULD MAKE ANY OTHER DECISION.

NOW ACTUALLY THE COMMITTEE ON ALL OF THEIR MEETINGS, AS FAR AS I KNOW I WAS PRESENT AS YOU MIGHT SAY AN EXPERT WITNESS AND CONSULTANT. ~~I DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION ITSELF. THE DECISIONS WERE REACHED THAT AFTER THOROUGH EXPLORATION OF EVERY OTHER POSSIBLE METHOD, COULD~~

why not a demonstration

THEY HAVE A DEMONSTRATION? WHAT WOULD THAT MEAN? HOW WOULD YOU HAVE A DEMONSTRATION? WHERE WOULD YOU HAVE IT?

if he had been Japanese at Almagordo he would not have advised surrender

WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECTS OF A DEMONSTRATION? WELL, WE HAD NOT AT THAT TIME SEEN THE EXPLOSION AT ALMAGORDO. I CAN JUST SAY THAT IF I HAD BEEN A JAPANESE OBSERVER AND SEEN THE BOMB GO OFF AT ALMAGORDO, I WOULD NOT HAVE ADVISED SURRENDER. IT'S ONE THING TO SEE SOMETHING GO OFF, CREATING NO DAMAGE AT ALL BUT CREATING A GREAT BIG BALL OF FIRE AND OBVIOUSLY OF TREMENDOUS POWER AND ALL OF THAT, BUT IT'S ANOTHER THING TO SAY: "WELL, NOW, THEY SET THIS OFF ON A TOWER—MAYBE IT WEIGHS FIFTY TONS. HOW DO WE KNOW THEY CAN DELIVER IT? HOW DO WE KNOW THEY CAN GET ALL THE MECHANISMS PERFECTED SO THEY CAN DELIVER IT?" AND I AM PRETTY SURE THAT ANYONE WHO WAS A SOUND THINKER WOULD HAVE SAID, "NO, THAT DOESN'T CONVINC US. IN THE FIRST PLACE WOULD THEY HAVE ANOTHER?" NOBODY KNEW WHAT WE MADE THE

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 3

*germans would
have said don't
surrender*

BOMB OF. WE COULD TELL THEM BUT THEY COULDN'T TELL
FOR SURE AND THERE IS ANOTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WE
MIGHT HAVE MADE IT OUT OF BUT I THINK AT THE TIME THERE
WAS ONLY ENOUGH MATERIAL FOR ONE BOMB. THE GERMANS, OF
COURSE, IF THEY HAD BEEN CONSULTED--THEY WEREN'T IN ANY
POSITION TO BE CONSULTED AT THAT TIME, BUT IF THEY HAD
BEEN THEY WOULD HAVE SAID, "OH, IT'S IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM
TO HAVE A BOMB AND IF THEY DID, THEY COULD ONLY HAVE ONE,"
BECAUSE THE GERMANS DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW WE WERE GOING
TO MAKE THIS BOMB AND THEY THOUGHT OF IT AS A BOMB THAT
WOULD HAVE TO CONTAIN ABOUT TWENTY TONS OF U-235. SO
THERE ARE MANY REASONS WHY--YOU COULD NOT IMAGINE ANYONE
BEING CERTAIN OF A DEMONSTRATION. }

ATOMIC BOMB

ROLL 3 SND 4

GENERAL GROVES

GROVES:

30.
IN JULY OF 1945, WE ANTICIPATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE
THE TEST EXPLOSION AT ALMAGORDO AT ABOUT THE MIDDLE
OF JULY. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH, WE
PICKED JULY 16TH AS THE FIRST DATE ON WHICH WE COULD
BE READY. IT'S IMPORTANT TO REALIZE WHY WE HAD TO HAVE
SO MUCH COORDINATION. THE REASON WAS THAT WE JUST DIDN'T
HAVE THE FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. WE HAD THESE ENORMOUS
PLANTS OPERATING BUT THEY WERE JUST COMING INTO PRODUC-
TION ON THE PLUTONIUM WHICH WAS TO BE USED IN THE BOMB AT
ALMAGORDO. ORIGINALLY WE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE CHANCES
OF A SUCCESSFUL EXPLOSION THE FIRST TIME WERE NOT TOO
GOOD. THEN AS TIME WENT ON, WE THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE
GETTING BETTER AND BETTER ALL THE TIME SO THAT BY THE TIME
OF THE ACTUAL TEST, THERE WAS A FEELING ON MY OWN PART
THAT IF THIS HAD BEEN URANIUM 235 WE WOULDN'T HAVE HAD
THE TEST. I WAS THAT CONFIDENT OF ITS BEING SUCCESSFUL.
THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION AS TO WHAT THE
STRENGTH OF THE BOMB WOULD BE. WE HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE BETWEEN TEN AND TWENTY THOUSAND TONS EQUI-
VALENT OF TNT. THERE WERE SOME PEOPLE WHO THOUGHT IT
WOULD BE DOWN AS LOW AS 250 TONS OF TNT. THERE HAS A
GREAT DEAL BEEN SAID IN RECENT YEARS ABOUT WHAT WAS THOUGHT
AT THE TIME AND ALL THAT. I CAN TELL YOU WHAT I THOUGHT
PERSONALLY AND WHAT WAS TOLD ME BY THE PEOPLE THAT WERE
DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE AND WERE UNDER ME. PERSONALLY, I SAW
NO REASON TO CHANGE OUR ORIGINAL ESTIMATE WHICH HAD BEEN
MADE ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE THOUGHT WE COULD GET OUT OF
IT. OTHER PEOPLE GOT A LITTLE BIT NERVOUS AS TIME WENT ON
AND THEY STARTED TO MAKE ADVERSE POSSIBILITIES SEEM MORE

LIKE PROBABILITIES--MORE OR LESS IN THE WAY THAT A PERSON GOING OUT ON A PICNIC CARRIES BOTH AN UMBRELLA AND A PARASOL. HE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD RAIN OR IT WOULD BE TOO SUNNY. SO THAT'S THE TIME WHEN IT REQUIRES A GREAT DEAL OF STEADINESS OF NERVE AND INABILITY TO GET EXCITED OR DISTRESSED. AT ANY RATE WHEN WE SET THE APPROXIMATE DATE, I WANTED DOCTOR BUSH AND DOCTOR CONANT WHO HAD BEEN SO PROMINENT IN THIS PROJECT. RIGHT FROM THE START THEY WERE THE ONES WHO HAD GOTTEN THE ARMY INTO IT BY ASKING THAT IT BE TRANSFERRED TO THE ARMY AND DOCTOR CONANT HAD BEEN MY--ONE OF MY TWO SCIENTIFIC ADVISERS THROUGHOUT, ALONG WITH DOCTOR TOLLMAN, FORMER GRADUATE DEAN AT CALIFORNIA TECH. IN ORDER NOT TO GO OUT THERE AND SIT THERE IN ADVANCE WHICH IS THE WORST THING PEOPLE AT THE TOP CAN DO--SIT DOWN AND SORT OF LOOK DOWN THE THROATS OF THE PEOPLE THAT ARE TRYING TO GET THEIR JOB DONE AT THE LAST MINUTE. IT'S JUST AS IF SOMEONE WHO IS APPEARING BEFORE TV CAMERAS --OR IF THE PRESIDENT OF NBC TRIES TO TELL THE CAMERAMAN HOW TO SET UP THE CAMERA. THAT'S THE WORST THING THAT CAN HAPPEN, AND IN MY CASE I SAID WE'RE NOT GOING TO BE THERE IN ADVANCE. I HAD GENERAL FARRELL THERE TAKING CARE OF THE DETAILS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ADVANCE SAFETY PRECAUTIONS. SO I TOOK DR. BUSH AND DR. CONANT AND WE WENT FIRST TO HANFORD, WASHINGTON AND FROM HANFORD WASHINGTON WE FLEW DOWN TO SAN FRANCISCO WHERE THE RADIATION LABORATORY WAS WHERE WE HAD A GREAT DEAL OF WORK GOING ON. FROM THERE WE WENT DOWN TO INYOKERN WHICH WAS WHERE WE WERE HAVING CERTAIN EXPLOSIVE WORK DONE FOR US AND FROM THERE TO PASADENA AND FROM THERE OVER TO ALBUQUERQUE. ALL THE TIME WE

get ready to be
an hand but why
not go to Los
Alamos

ATOMIC BOMB
SND 4

WERE WITHIN A DISTANCE SO THAT IF THEY SET THE DATE UP
 A DAY, WE COULD HEAD STRAIGHT OVER THERE AND STILL BE
 THERE ON TIME. NOTHING OCCURRED...AND ALSO IF THEY GOT
 DELAYED A DAY, INSTEAD OF GOING THERE AND SITTING AND
 LOOKING DOWN THEIR THROATS, WE WOULD HAVE TAKEN AN EXTRA
 DAY IN PASADENA OR AN EXTRA DAY ALONG THE LINE. ANY-
 WAY, WE ARRIVED THERE THE AFTERNOON BEFORE. IT WAS WHAT
 YOU'D EXPECT TO SEE UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS...EVERYONE QUITE
 TENSE, EVERYONE DISTURBED AND A BIT WORRIED. THE WEATHER
 WAS NOT GOOD. WE WANTED A DEFINITE WIND DIRECTION SO THAT
 IF WE HAD A CLOUD OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AS WE EXPECTED
 THAT IT WOULD NOT PASS OVER ANY CITY OF ANY SIZE AND THIS
 MEANT THAT IT HAD TO BE SORT OF GUIDED--OF COURSE IT WENT
 IN A STRAIGHT LINE, SO YOU HAD TO FIGURE OUT JUST WHERE
 THAT WIND WAS. THE WORST PROBLEM WAS AMARILLO AND WE DID
 NOT WANT ANY CLOUD TO GET OVER AMARILLO AND HAVE A RAIN
 STORM BRING THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DOWN. THERE WERE OTHER
 SMALLER TOWNS ON THE WAY OVER SO IT HAD TO BE SORT OF
 THREADED LIKE THE NEEDLE, THE THREAD IN THE NEEDLE. WE
 ALSO DID NOT WANT ANY RAIN. WE HAD HEARD ALL THE STORIES
 ABOUT VIOLENT CANNONADING BRINGING ON THUNDERSTORMS IF
 THE WEATHER WAS SUITABLE AND SO WE JUST DID NOT WANT RAIN
 OR RAIN CONDITIONS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAD WEATHER
 PREDICTORS, THEY DIDN'T PREDICT TOO WELL AND FINALLY IT
 WENT FROM BAD TO WORSE. A GREAT MANY OF THE SCIENTISTS
 WERE ADVISING DR. OPPENHEIMER WHEN I GOT THERE TO POSTPONE
 THE EXPLOSION. I WAS NEVER MORE REMINDED OF A HIGHSCHOOL
 FOOTBALL TEAM THAN I WAS AT THAT PERIOD WITH EVERYBODY TRY-
 ING TO TALK AT ONE TIME, NONE OF THEM REALLY KNOWING WHAT

know it
was at
Albuquerque
the day before

wind problem

rain problem

weather
predictors no
good
Scientists wanted
to postpone

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 4

*In a conference
Tells to weather
people*

*GROVES takes
over weather
predicting*

*sends Oppie to
bed to keep from
getting nervous*

*Groves & Conant
sleep*

*Tent flaps
all night*

*up at 12
and out to
site*

THEY WERE DOING IN THIS RESPECT AND BEING VERY MUCH
EXCITED. I FINALLY TOOK DR. OPPENHEIMER OFF INTO A
ROOM BY HIMSELF. WE HAD THE WEATHER PEOPLE IN. WE
TALKED TO THEM AND FROM THAT TIME ON, I DID MY OWN
WEATHER PREDICTING BECAUSE THE EXPERT WE HAD HAD FAILED
AND THE PEOPLE THAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT IN AT THE LAST
MINUTE TO SEE IF THIS MAN WAS ON THE RIGHT TRACK, GAVE
ME CERTAIN ADVICE AND THAT WAS VERY USEFUL. BUT IT WAS
A SITUATION WHERE I DID NOT WANT DR. OPPENHEIMER TO GET
NERVOUS. AT A REASONABLE HOUR, SOMETHING LIKE 9:30, I
TOLD HIM THAT HE SHOULD GO TO BED AND BE CALLED AT 12:00.
HE SAID, "YOU CAN'T SLEEP, CAN YOU?" AND I SAID, "WHY,
YES, I'M GOING OVER THERE AND DR. BUSH AND CONANT ARE
GOING WITH ME AND WE'LL GO TO SLEEP IN A TENT OVER HERE."
WELL, THE TENT HAD BEEN PUT UP BY MEN WHO EITHER WEREN'T
EXPERIENCED IN PUTTING UP TENTS OR ELSE THEY THOUGHT WE'LL
TAKE CARE OF THAT GENERAL. AT ANY RATE THE ROPES WERE
LOOSE. THERE WAS A VERY HIGH WIND AND IT SLAPPED PRETTY
BADLY, SLAPPED ENOUGH SO THAT I THOUGHT AT ONE TIME MAYBE
I'D BETTER GO OUT AND TIGHTEN UP THOSE TENT ROPES. BUT I
DIDN'T AND I WENT TO SLEEP. THEN AT MIDNIGHT WE WERE CALLED.
CONANT SAID TO ME AFTERWARDS, "I DON'T SEE HOW YOU SLEPT
AND YET I KNOW YOU WERE SLEEPING OVER THERE--WISHING I
COULD GET A WINK OF SLEEP WITH ALL THE NOISE AND THE EXCITE-
MENT THAT WE FELT." I THEN GOT DR. OPPENHEIMER AND WE WENT
OUT TO THE ADVANCE POINT WHICH WAS FIVE MILES FROM THE
POINT OF THE EXPLOSION. IT'S WHERE OUR FIRING EQUIPMENT
WAS AND WAS THE CONTROL ELEMENT. GENERAL FARRELL WAS THERE.

ATOMIC BOMB

CND 4

THAT WAS THE PLACE I HAD SELECTED FOR HIM TO BE. IT
 WAS IN A DUGOUT, PERFECTLY SAFE IN EVERY RESPECT. THE
 PLACE WHERE I WAS TO BE WAS THE BASE CAMP WHICH WAS TEN
 MILES AWAY AND THAT WAS THE NEAREST POINT, THAT IS—
 TEN MILES FROM THE CENTER OF THE EXPLOSION--THAT IS THE
 NEAREST POINT FROM WHICH WHERE WE PERMITTED ANYONE TO
 BE OUT OF DOORS AND EXPOSED OPENLY TO IT. THROUGHOUT
 THIS PERIOD, THE WEATHER GOT WORSE AND WORSE. IT WAS
 JUST ONE OF THOSE SORT OF HALF DRIZZLES. YOU DIDN'T
 KNOW WHETHER IT WAS GOING TO TURN INTO A REAL RAIN OR
 WHETHER IT WAS GOING TO CLEAR UP, AND THROUGHOUT THE TIME
 I WAS THERE, I WAS SPENDING ALL THE TIME WITH OPPENHEIMER
 KEEPING PEOPLE FROM GETTING HIM UNDULY DISTURBED OR ANY-
 THING OF THAT KIND. THE REASON FOR THAT WAS: HE WAS
 GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE THE FINAL DETERMINATION. I WOULDN'T
 BE THERE. I WOULD BE BACK OUT FIVE MILES AWAY. GENERAL
 FARRELL, OF COURSE, WOULD HAVE SOME CONTROL BUT MOSTLY IN
 THE WAY OF ADVICE. OPPENHEIMER WAS IN THE POSITION OF A
 QUARTERBACK CALLING THE SIGNALS, AND I WANTED HIM TO BE AS
 CALM AS POSSIBLE IN CALLING THOSE. SO I STAYED RIGHT WITH
 HIM AND WE TALKED TO EACH OTHER. WE'D GO OUTSIDE; WE'D
 LOOK UP AT THE STARS AND TRY TO FIND THEM. EACH TIME I
 WOULD SAY THAT THERE WAS ONE MORE UP THERE. ACTUALLY,
 THERE WERE ABOUT THREE. AND WE GOT NEWS FROM THE AIRFIELD
 AT ALBUQUERQUE WHERE OUR OBSERVATION PLANES WERE THAT
 THE COMMANDING OFFICER THERE WOULD NOT PERMIT HIS PLANES
 TO GO UP THERE BECAUSE OF THE TURBULENCE. WE POSTPONED
 THE EXPLOSION--I DID--FOR I BELIEVE AN HOUR. IT MAY HAVE

weather gets
worse

keeping Oppie
calm

it was Oppie's
decision

observation
planes called off

post pause for
1 hour

most permanent
means down a
people will see it

Graves decides
to go ahead

why would it
cause star

Graves leaves
office & heads
for camp

BEEN AN HOUR AND A HALF. I HATED TO DO THAT BECAUSE IT
MEANT THAT WE WOULD NO LONGER BE HAVING THE EXPLOSION
BEFORE—WHEN EVERYBODY SUPPOSEDLY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN
BED AND THEREFORE WOULDN'T BE DISTURBED BY IT AND
WOULDN'T KNOW THAT ANYTHING HAD HAPPENED.] SO IT GOT
ALONG AND IT ACTUALLY WENT OFF WHEN PEOPLE WERE UP
A LITTLE, BUT NOT TOO MANY PEOPLE. JUST BEFORE THE EX-
PLOSION, I FINALLY DECIDED WE WOULD DO IT ANYWAY DES-
PITE THE SLIGHT MISTINESS AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE
WERE A LOT OF RAIN CLOUDS UP THERE. I DON'T KNOW WHY WE
WERE SO STUPID. WE SHOULD HAVE HAD MORE SENSE AND REALIZED
THAT THE TERRIFIC HEAT OF THIS THING IF IT REALLY WAS AS
POWERFUL AS WE THOUGHT, WOULD EVAPORATE ALL OF THE WATER
ANYWAY] BECAUSE WHEN IT ACTUALLY FIRED YOU WERE NO LONGER
CONSCIOUS OF ANY MIST UP THERE AT ALL. IT WAS ALL JUST
PLAIN EVAPORATED FROM THE TREMENDOUS HEAT.] I LEFT OPPEN-
HEIMER AND WENT BACK TO THE BASE CAMP AND ABOUT...TEN OR
FIFTEEN MINUTES...I LEFT THERE TWENTY MINUTES I THINK
BEFORE WHICH WE FIGURED WAS TIME ENOUGH FOR ME TO GET
BACK. THE ORDERS WERE THAT THEY WERE TO FIRE IT ANYWAY—
THAT I WOULD TAKE CARE OF MYSELF AND THE DRIVER AND THERE
WOULDN'T BE ANY TROUBLE. WE'D TAKE COVER, ALL RIGHT. SO
THEY WEREN'T TO WAIT FOR US.] THE MEN LEFT THE TOWER WHERE
THEY HAD BEEN WATCHING THE BOMB SHORTLY BEFORE. THEY HAD
A KEY TO THE FINAL SWITCH BOX. WHAT WE WOULD HAVE DONE IF
THEY HAD BROKEN DOWN ON THE WAY, I DON'T KNOW. I THINK WE
PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FIRED IT BY BREAKING OPEN THE BOX. WE
WOULD HAVE IF GENERAL FARRELL HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONTROL THE

ATOMIC BOMB

END 4

the explosion

SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL THERE. [BACK AT THE BASE CAMP ABOUT TWO OR THREE MINUTES BEFORE THE EXPLOSION, WE ALL GOT ON THE GROUND, FACE DOWN, AND WAITED WITH OUR FEET TOWARD THE EXPLOSION AND THE ORDERS ISSUED WERE THAT NOBODY SHOULD TURN TO LOOK AT THE EXPLOSION AT THE COUNT DOWN UNTIL THEY SAW THE LIGHT. THEN THEY COULD TURN AROUND AND LOOK AT IT THROUGH SMOKED GLASS WHICH WE HAD--SPECIAL SMOKED GLASS. ALSO, THEY WERE TO KEEP THEIR EYES CLOSED AND HOLD THEIR HANDS OVER THEIR EYES. THE COUNT DOWN IS WHAT YOU ARE NOW ALL FAMILIAR WITH IN ROCKETS TO THE MOON AND SO FORTH. IT WAS RATHER DRAMATIC AT THE TIME BECAUSE WE WEREN'T USED TO COUNT DOWNS AND WHEN THE THING WENT OFF, IT WENT OFF RIGHT ON THE BUTTON AS IT WERE AT THE TIME, MY FIRST IMPRESSION WAS THIS TREMENDOUS LIGHT EFFECT AND COMING RIGHT THROUGH MY HANDS AND THROUGH MY CLOSED EYELIDS AND ALL THAT. AND THEN WHEN YOU TURNED AROUND TO SEE THE EXPLOSION, YOU TURNED AND DIDN'T WANT TO BOTHER TO GET UP. YOU DIDN'T WANT TO WASTE THAT FRACTION OF A SECOND. AT THAT TIME, IT LOOKED JUST LIKE A DERBY HAT AND THEN OF COURSE IT WENT UP INTO WHAT YOU'RE ALL FAMILIAR WITH TODAY. THE REACTION WAS ABOUT WHAT YOU WOULD HAVE EXPECTED. BOTH DR. BUSH AND DR. CONANT WERE NEW ENGLANDERS. THEY REACHED OVER AND SHOOK HANDS WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH ME AND WE GOT UP. ABOUT THAT TIME DR. FERMI STOOD UP AND STARTED TO TRICKLE HIS LITTLE TORN PIECES OF NEWSPAPER DOWN TO THE GROUND AND AS SOON AS THE BLAST WAVE HIT THERE, OF COURSE THE PAPERS WENT OFF TO ONE SIDE. HE MEASURED IT. I THINK HE HAD A RULE. WE MAY HAVE JUST

Fermi's measurement

ATOMIC BOMB

SND 4

TAKEN HIS FOOT MEASURE AND HE HAD FIGURED THIS ALL OUT
IN ADVANCE AND HE IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED WHAT THE POWER
OF THE EXPLOSION WAS. AND IT WAS JUST ABOUT AS ACCURATE
AS ANY OF THE EQUIPMENT WE HAD THERE TO MEASURE IT. AND
 THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF EXCITEMENT OF COURSE BECAUSE TO
 THESE MEN EVEN MORE THAN IT WAS TO ME. TO ME IT SPELLED
 THE END OF THE WAR. TO THEM IT SPELLED THE USHERING IN OF
 A NEW AGE, SOMETHING THAT THEY HAD HEARD ABOUT FROM THE
 TIME THEY HAD FIRST BECAME PHYSICS STUDENTS AND HAD CON-
 TINUED TO DREAM ABOUT AND ALL THAT. GENERAL FARRELL CAME
DOWN RATHER SHORTLY AS DID OPPENHEIMER FROM THE ADVANCE
BASE. I CAN STILL REMEMBER WHAT FARRELL SAID. HE CAME UP
TO ME AND HE SAID, "THE WAR IS OVER," AND I SAID, "NO,
NOT YET. IT WILL BE OVER AS SOON AS WE DROP THE ON JAPAN."
~~OPPENHEIMER WAS OF COURSE VERY MUCH DELIGHTED AS WERE ALL~~
~~THE OTHER PEOPLE.~~ I HAD GONE OUT THERE WITH THE EXPECTATION,
 NOT BEING OF AN EXCITABLE NATURE, AS SOON AS THIS WAS OVER--
 I KNEW I HAD TO WAIT THERE FOR SEVERAL HOURS TO BE SURE THAT
THERE WAS NO TROUBLE FROM THIS RADIOACTIVE CLOUD.] WE HAD
 PEOPLE ALL OVER THE AREA--TELEPHONE REPORTS COMING IN AND
 ALL OF THAT--WITH THE COMMAND POST FOR THE CHIEF MEDICAL
 OFFICER RIGHT THERE IN THE BUILDING AT THE SPACE CAMP. I
 THOUGHT I WOULD HAVE TO STAY THERE THREE OR FOUR HOURS
 TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT EVERYTHING WAS ALL RIGHT AND I COULD
 NO LONGER HAVE TO BOTHER ABOUT IT.] AND I THOUGHT DURING
THAT TIME I'VE GOT A LOT OF LITTLE THINGS--I'LL TALK TO
ALL OF THESE PEOPLE AND GET THEIR OPINION ON IT. I FOUND
YOU COULDN'T TALK TO THEM. AGAIN IT WAS THE ANALOGY OF THE

"the war is over"

Graves tried
 to work a card

END 4

HIGHSCHOOL FOOTBALL TEAM THAT HAD WON A GAME THAT THEY HAD NEVER EXPECTED TO WIN AND THEY WERE JUST TOO EXCITED TO TALK ABOUT ANYTHING SO I JUST GAVE THAT UP AND WENT OVER AND WATCHED THE OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CLOUD.
I NOTICED ON THE PLANE COMING BACK; I TOOK DR. CONANT AND DR. BUSH WITH ME...

FREED: GENERAL GROVES, WHAT ABOUT THE MESSAGE THAT YOU SENT? WHEN DID YOU SEND A MESSAGE AND WHEN DID YOU CALL...

GROVES: WELL, AS SOON AS THE BOMB WENT OFF, I BELIEVED AS SOON AS I COULD I GOT A TELEPHONE CALL THROUGH TO MY CHIEF SECRETARY WHO LONG BEFORE THAT HAD BECOME MY EXECUTIVE IN MY WASHINGTON OFFICE. AND UNLIKE MOST WASHINGTON OFFICES THEN AND PARTICULARLY TODAY, I HAD STARTED OFF WITH TWO ROOMS AND BY THAT TIME I HAD GOTTEN UP TO FIVE SO THAT IT WAS NOT A BIG OFFICE. I GOT HER ON THE PHONE AND GAVE HER THE ONE USE CODE MESSAGE THAT I HAD WHICH TOLD HER WHAT HAD HAPPENED. SHE IMMEDIATELY CALLED UP MR. STIMSON'S REPRESENTATIVE, THE CIVILIAN ASSISTANT I TOLD YOU ABOUT, MR. GEORGE HARRISON, WHO AT TIME WAS PRESIDENT OF NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE AND WAS DOWN AS A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO MR. STIMSON. SHE WENT OVER AND TOLD HIM—SHE CALLED HIM AND SAID I'VE GOT NEWS FOR YOU. I'M ON THE WAY AND IT'S GOOD NEWS. AND AS SOON AS SHE GOT OVER THERE, SHE REALIZED THAT SOMEHOW WE HAD SLIPPED UP AND WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY CODE WITH MR. STIMSON. SO, IN DISCUSSION WITH MR. HARRISON, THEY FRAMED THE MESSAGES THAT WENT OVER TO MR. STIMSON AND THE FIRST MESSAGE WAS SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT—I THINK THAT MESSAGE IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN NOW AND CAN BE USED VERY EASILY, BUT IT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT

calls his secretary Mrs O'Leary

she calls Harrison

forgot code for Stimson

THE BABY HAD BEEN BORN, THAT THE DOCTOR--AND I THINK
 THEY EVEN SAID DR. GROVES WAS VERY MUCH PLEASED AND
 THAT HE'S A VERY LUSTY INFANT, THAT HIS CRIES COULD
 BE HEARD--AND THEN THEY GAVE THE NAME OF MR. HARRISON'S
 COUNTRY HOME IN VIRGINIA NEAR WARRENTON--AND THE FLASH
 IN HIS EYES CAN BE SEEN, AND THEN THEY GAVE THE COUNTRY
 PLACE OF MR. STIMSON UP ON LONG ISLAND. AND IT WAS A
 PERFECT MESSAGE; IT TOLD MR. STIMSON EXACTLY WHAT HE
 WANTED TO KNOW.] WHEN I GOT BACK TO WASHINGTON, WE SENT
 A FEW MORE CABLES TELLING A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT IT
 AND THEN MR. HARRISON MADE A VERY WISE SUGGESTION. [HE
 SAID, "I THINK YOU SHOULD WRITE THIS OUT AND SEND IT
 OVER." WELL, HE MADE THIS SUGGESTION ABOUT 12:30 IN THE
 AFTERNOON. I THINK HE WAS IN MY OFFICE AT THE TIME.
 AS SOON AS HE LEFT I CALLED IN GENERAL FARRELL AND SAID
 THAT I WANTED HIM TO START PREPARING THIS MESSAGE AND I
 ALSO HAD SOMEONE ELSE CALL UP THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE
 AND GET THE ACTING SECRETARY THERE AND TELL HIM I WANTED
 TO SEND THIS OVER ON THE NEXT PLANE AND HE TOLD ME WHEN
 IT LEFT. I SAID, "YOU'LL HAVE TO HOLD IT A COUPLE OF
 HOURS SO WE CAN GET THIS DONE." I WAS TIED UP ON AN
 APPOINTMENT THAT I COULDN'T BREAK THAT AFTERNOON, SO OUT-
 SIDE OF WRITING THE FIRST PARAGRAPH, COULDN'T DO ANYTHING
 ON THE REPORT UNTIL AFTER ABOUT 6:30. AND THIS FIRST PARA-
 GRAPH STARTED OFF WITH JUST SAYING: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY,"
 AND IT SAID THAT I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO WRITE THE REPORT IN
 NORMAL MILITARY STYLE--THAT I WAS WRITING JUST AS I WOULD
 TALK IT TO HIM IF HE HAD BEEN IN HIS OFFICE AND I WAS SITTING
 THERE TALKING TO HIM. GENERAL FARRELL WAS A VERY DRAMATIC

Baby born

*Harrison says
write report & Graves
does*

WRITER AND HE WROTE A MAGNIFICENT REPORT ON THE PART THAT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR. THEN ALSO HE INCLUDED IN THAT A--THE IMPRESSIONS OF GENERAL FARRELL WRITTEN BY HIM PERSONALLY, AND RECOGNIZED AS SUCH, THE IMPRESSIONS OF DR. ERNEST LAWRENCE WHO WAS VERY HIGHLY RESPECTED BY SECRETARY STIMSON AND THEN I WOUND UP THE REPORT. WE HAD FINISHED THAT. WE ONLY ALLOWED TWO SECRETARIES TO WORK ON IT, THE ONLY TWO THAT WE HAD THAT KNEW AS MUCH AS THEY NEEDED--THAT THEY WOULDN'T LEARN TOO MUCH FROM IT AND THEY WORKED UNTIL...I THINK WE FINISHED IT ABOUT TWO O'CLOCK OR TWO THIRTY IN THE MORNING, AND BY THE TIME IT WAS FINISHED--IT WAS ROUGH DRAFTED FIRST AND THEN CORRECTED AND THEN MAYBE RE-CORRECTED. BY THE TIME THEY FINISHED, THEY HAD REACHED A POINT OF EXHAUSTION BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN THERE SINCE BEFORE EIGHT THAT MORNING AND IT WAS JUST TORTURE FOR THEM TO TYPE A PAGE. THEY COULD HARDLY TYPE WITHOUT WONDERING, "WELL, I WONDER WHERE THIS FINGER IS GOING TO HIT." BUT THE REPORT WAS FINISHED; IT WAS SENT OVER. IT REACHED THERE AND MADE A TERRIFIC IMPRESSION ON ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND MR. CHURCHILL. I THINK THE BEST THING WAS SAID BY CHURCHILL WHEN HE SAID THAT AFTER READING THE REPORT...HE HAD BEEN TOLD ABOUT IT BY MR. STIMSON. AND THEN HE READ THE REPORT AND HE SAID, "NOW, I KNOW WHY MR. TRUMAN WAS SO...TOOK CHARGE OF THAT MEETING YESTERDAY WITH STALIN." AND I THINK IMMEDIATELY THE ULTIMATUM WAS SENT TO JAPAN, ONLY THIS TIME IT WAS MUCH MORE POSITIVE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY ARRANGEMENTS WITH MR. STIMSON, I HAD TO WAIT UNTIL THERE WAS ADEQUATE TIME FOR THE JAPANESE TO REPLY. THAT WAS THE REASON...

FREED:

GENERAL GROVES, SIR, I WANTED TO ASK YOU ABOUT THAT. WAS IT YOUR AIM TO HAVE THE BOMB READY BY THE TENTH OF AUGUST...BEFORE THE TENTH OF AUGUST?

GROVES:

MY AIM WAS TO HAVE THE BOMB READY JUST AS SOON AS WE COULD GET THE MATERIAL READY AND WE DECIDED THAT WE COULD GET THE FINAL MATERIAL READY IN TIME TO...IT HAD TO BE PROCESSED AND FORMED INTO THE PROPER SHAPES... THE FINAL PIECES HAD TO BE FLOWN OVER TO TINIAN. THE BULK OF IT HAD BEEN SENT OVER ON THE CRUISER, INDIANAPOLIS, WHICH WAS SUNK JUST AFTERWARDS AND THE FINAL PIECES WERE SENT OVER THERE. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WE HAD TO CONSIDER WAS: HOW DO YOU INCREASE THE PRODUCTION TO GET A LITTLE BIT MORE? AND IT WAS SORT OF LIKE A LOT OF THINGS YOU DO. YOU MADE THIS LAST DITCH EFFORT AND YOU GOT IT FINISHED IN TIME AND THEN OF COURSE YOU LOST A LITTLE TIME DUE TO THAT. BUT IT WAS VERY CAREFULLY SCHEDULED. IT GOT THERE. IT COULD HAVE BEEN DROPPED ON THE 30TH OF JULY. THE ORDER SAID IT WAS TO BE DROPPED AFTER, ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 4TH, I BELIEVE AND THAT HAS CREATED A LOT OF DISCUSSION AMONG HISTORIANS WHO ARE ALWAYS TRYING TO READ SOMETHING INTO IT. AND THERE WASN'T ANYTHING INTO IT: ON OR ABOUT IN MILITARY PARLANCE MEANT THAT YOU HAD YOUR CHOICE IN THE FIELD AND YOU DIDN'T HAVE TO BE...THAT EXACTLY THE DATE THAT WAS PICKED. IT COULD BE THREE OR FOUR DAYS AHEAD OF TIME OR THREE OR FOUR DAYS LATER. WE WERE DEPENDENT ENTIRELY UPON THE WEATHER. GENERAL FARRELL DID SEND ME A CABLE ON--I THINK IT WAS THE THIRTIETH OF JULY IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE AND GENERAL LE MAY WHO WAS STILL IN COMMAND BECAUSE THERE WAS A SWITCH OF

air ready to have
bombs as soon as
could
(not Aug 10 as date)

Historians try to
read something into
this

cable from
Farrell re date

ATOMIC BOMB

3ND 4

COMMAND JUST COMING TO SPAATZ AND LE MAY WAS ALWAYS
CHIEF OF STAFF AND WAS THE MAN WHO COORDINATED EVERY-
THING TO DO WITH THIS OPERATION IN THE FIELD. FARRELL'S
CABLE SAID...OR RADIO...SAID THAT HE AND LE MAY UNDERSTOOD
THE DATE TO BE THE 31ST. THEY COULD DROP IT THEN IF THEY
WERE READY AND THEY OF COURSE WERE RIGHT AND THE WORDING
WAS VERY CLEAR BUT A HISTORIAN, NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE SER-
VICE, COULD VERY EASILY BE MISLED BY IT AND I THINK THEY
HAVE BEEN,] BUT I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANYTHING ELSE IN
PARTICULAR ABOUT THAT DATE PROBLEM, EXCEPTING THAT WE JUST
HAD TO WAIT THEN UNTIL THE WEATHER WAS SUITABLE. [OUR
SECOND BOMB WENT MUCH SOONER THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED BE-
CAUSE WE JUST GOT THE MATERIAL DONE SOONER. [THERE WAS A
THIRD BOMB THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN READY SEVERAL DAYS--MAYBE
A DAY OR TWO AFTER V-J DAY. I WENT TO GENERAL MARSHALL
AND TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS TIME THAT WE WOULD BE SHIPPING
THE MATERIAL OVER BUT IN VIEW OF ALL THAT I HAD LEARNED
FROM SECRETARY STIMSON ABOUT THE FUTURE HISTORICAL POSITION
OF THE UNITED STATES BEING SO IMPORTANT THAT I FELT THAT WE
SHOULD HOLD THAT MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES SO THAT NO
ONE COULD SAY THAT WE WERE JUST OUT THERE--WE DIDN'T HAVE
TO USE IT; WE JUST WANTED TO INFLICT PUNISHMENT ON JAPAN.
THIS IS EVERYTHING THAT I PRESENTED TO GENERAL MARSHALL
IN THE FORM OF A SHORT MEMORANDUM WHICH SAID EVERYTHING
THAT HE NEEDED TO KNOW AND THEN I WOULD ADD ANYTHING THAT
WAS NEEDED TO MAKE IT CLEARER TO HIM. HE APPROVED THAT
DELAY OF THE SHIPMENT UNTIL NOON OF THE THIRTEENTH, I
BELIEVE WAS THE DATE AND HE ALSO WROTE ON IT THAT--IN PEN-
CIL, AND HE VERY SELDOM WROTE ANYTHING. ON ANY MEMORANDUM

*why Nagasaki
 bomb early*

*3rd bomb
 why not dropped*

I HANDED HIM, HE WOULD JUST HAND IT BACK AND THAT WAS AN INDICATION AND I WOULD MAKE A NOTE THAT IT WAS— THAT IT HAD BEEN SHOWN TO GENERAL MARSHALL AND HE HAD NOT OBJECTED OR THAT HE HAD APPROVED. WE HAD HAD SOME TROUBLE WITH PAPERS AND HE JUST DIDN'T WANT ANY OF MY PAPERS IN HIS POSSESSION, SO THAT'S THE REASON HE WOULD HAND THEM BACK TO ME. ON THIS OCCASION WHEN THE THIRTEENTH CAME AROUND, I WENT OVER THERE. I COULD SMELL THE SURRENDER IN THE AIR. THERE WAS A LOT OF EXCITEMENT IN CERTAIN CIRCLES IN WASHINGTON BUT THE BOMBING OF JAPAN HAD BEEN RESUMED BY THE AIR FORCE. SO I WENT OVER TO SEE GENERAL MARSHALL WITH THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD APPROVE MY DELAYING THE SHIPMENT OF THIS A LITTLE BIT MORE. HE WAS NOT AVAILABLE; NEITHER WAS THE SECRETARY OF WAR. THEY WERE IN DISCUSSING THE SURRENDER TERMS. THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL HANDY, TOLD ME I COULDN'T SEE THEM; THAT THEY HAD JUST LEFT WORD AND I SAID, "WELL, I'M IN A SPOT," AND I TOLD HIM WHAT IT WAS. HE SAID, "I DON'T SEE WHAT YOU CAN DO. YOU CAN'T TALK TO THEM," AND I SAID "WELL, YOU WILL SEE THEM SOONER OR LATER AND I CAN'T AFFORD TO SIT OVER HERE. I'VE GOT TOO MANY THINGS THAT I'VE GOT TO BE WATCHING ALL THE TIME, SO WHENEVER YOU CAN GET A CHANCE, IF YOU WILL JUST TELL GENERAL MARSHALL THAT I AM HOLDING UP THE SHIPMENT OF THAT MATERIAL UNTIL I HEAR FROM HIM TO THE CONTRARY." AND I DIDN'T HEAR ANYTHING AND THEN, OF COURSE, CAME V-J DAY AND AFTERWARDS, WHEN I WAS TALKING TO GENERAL MARSHALL ONE TIME, HE SAID, "I'M AWFULLY GLAD YOU DID THAT BECAUSE IT'S JUST WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE. IF YOU HAD DONE THE OTHER THING, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN

GROVES:

Fermi a
his bet

ONE INTERESTING THAT HAPPENED DURING THE EVENING AT ALMAGORDO WAS CAUSED BY DR. FERMI. FERMI WAS ONE OF OUR MOST DISTINGUISHED PHYSICISTS. HE HAD DONE MORE, I THINK, THAN ALMOST ANYONE BUT SO MANY MEN DID SO MUCH YOU CAN HARDLY SINGLE OUT A ONE...BUT HE HAD BEEN JUST THOUGHT OF AS ONE OF THE SUPREME MEN AT CHICAGO IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLUTONIUM PROBLEMS. THEN LATER, WHEN THAT SEEMED TO BE IN THE CLEAR, WE MOVED HIM TO LOS ALAMOS WHERE HE HAD HELPED IN THE ACTUAL WORK IN DESIGN OF THE BOMB. DURING THAT EVENING WHEN THINGS WERE SORT OF UPSET, HE ANNOYED ME FOR A FEW MINUTES UNTIL I STARTED TO FIGURE OUT WHY HE DID IT BY ANNOUNCING TO A CROWD THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS QUITE A CHANCE THAT WHEN THIS BOMB WENT OFF THAT IT WOULD SET OFF THE ATMOSPHERE AND DESTROY NEW MEXICO; IT MIGHT DESTROY THE WORLD AND HE WANTED TO TAKE SOME BETS ON THAT POSSIBILITY. AND NOBODY IN THAT GROUP SEEMED TO WONDER AS TO--IF IT DESTROYED NEW MEXICO OR DESTROYED THE WORLD, HOW WOULD YOU EVER PAY OFF A BET, ANYWAY? BUT I THINK, AS I THOUGHT OF IT AFTERWARDS, I FELT THAT FERMI REALIZED AS WELL AS I DID HOW EXCITED EVERYBODY WAS AND HE JUST WANTED TO SORT OF CALM THEM DOWN AND HE THOUGHT THAT BY INTRODUCING SOMETHING THAT WAS OF A SCIENTIFIC NATURE THAT THAT WOULD APPEAL TO THEM; THEIR MINDS WOULD ALL START WORKING IN THAT DIRECTION INSTEAD OF WORRYING ABOUT WHAT WE WERE ENGAGED IN. FOR SOME REASON SOME PEOPLE HAVE THOUGHT THAT I WAS CRITICAL OF FERMI. ALL I CAN SAY IS--WHEN I FIRST HEARD HIM, I WAS QUITE ANNOYED AND THEN I STARTED TO THINK WHAT THIS COULD ALL MEAN ANYWAY AND WHY HAD HE DONE IT AND THEN I THOUGHT--WELL

ATOMIC BOMB

LL 3 SND 5

HE'S JUST TRYING TO CALM THEM DOWN, AND ANYTHING THAT WILL CALM THESE PEOPLE DOWN, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

FREED: DO YOU WANT TO TELL ME BRIEFLY ABOUT THE FACT THAT GENERAL MARSHALL DID NOT INTERFERE...

GROVES: ONE REASON WHY WE WERE SUCCESSFUL WAS NON-INTERFERENCE FROM ABOVE. GENERAL MARSHALL NEVER INTERFERED WITH ANYTHING THAT WAS GOING ON. HE DIDN'T ASK FOR REGULAR REPORTS; HE SAW ME WHENEVER I WANTED TO SEE HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS WERE VERY CLEAR. I AIDED A LITTLE IN THIS BECAUSE I NEVER TOOK AN EXTRA MINUTE OF HIS TIME, BOTH BECAUSE I KNEW THAT HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY TIME TO WASTE AND ALSO I WAS MORE OR LESS ON THE DEAD RUN ALL THE TIME. THE SAME THING WAS TRUE OF SECRETARY STIMSON, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF INTERFERING ON THE TARGET OF KYOTO; NEVER ONCE WAS THERE ANY INTERFERENCE OR INTRUSION; NEVER ONCE DID I HAVE TO EXPLAIN WHY; NEVER ONCE DID I HAVE TO TALK ABOUT APPROVAL FOR MONEY APPROPRIATIONS.

no interference from General Marshall

FREED: THAT'S FINE...PERFECT

GENERAL GROVES

ATOM BOMB

SOUND 831

RPT: I think the best way to say this, to ask you this is: all that we were talking about is, did you ever get an order or directive saying: "General Groves, now's the time to drop the bomb?"

GROVES: Many things are -- no -- One detail, and to me it was just a detail, has been much discussed by writers of recent years who were not familiar with the workings of the project, and that was the directive for the actual use of the weapon. They have seemed to think that there would have been a formal paper which the President of the United States wrote: "The bomb will be dropped on such and such a place anytime after such and such a date." That is not the way that it was done. Having been assigned the problem, or the responsibility for the preparation of the plans for the use of the bomb by General Marshall, my first step was to set up a target committee on which we had the -- it was really a joint committee made up of people from my organization and people from the Air Force. This committee was established, of course it operated under my direction, but there was no question left in the minds

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CU

of the Air Force members ~~xxxx~~ at the time
of the first meeting when General Norstadt
and myself talked to the meeting. I told
them what the mission was, that they were
to select the targets; I told them certain
of the criteria that I had arrived at; some
of them had been suggested by General Marshall
as to a certain type of target that he would
prefer to see used, and then General Nor-
stadt followed, speaking for General Arnold,
and told the Air Force members that the Air
Force headquarters was at their disposal,
that this was extremely important, and that
nothing but the very -- that nothing should
interfere with it and implied -- and those
two very short talks brought that committee
together so that they worked with a single
purpose, which is what all such organiza-
tions work with, anyway, of whatever is the
best thing for the United States. This
-- after the targets were selected, and of
course I kept in constant touch with it.
Some of the targets were suggested by me
or they were discussed with me, so that
long before anything was formalized by the
committee, I was in full agreement with what
they were going to propose. General Farrell,
who was my deputy who handled this partic-
ular phase for me in person by the -- he was
with the committee all the time, a member of

it. After this report was rendered to me, I then prepared a report to the Chief of Staff and Secretary Stimson. This report included the targets that I recommended, and a brief outline of each one, very -- the whole paper was -- took about five minutes to read -- five to ten, despite its importance.

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com meeting
CU

[Then there was the one page draft of the directive, and this directive was the order that would be issued to the Commanding General of that Air Force operation in the Guam area.] ~~Then the next -- after that directive was discussed with Secretary Stimson and General Marshall and the targets were discussed, and General -- and Secretary Stimson had ruled out Kyoto as a target,~~ then this directive was held waiting the time when we could actually write in the final date as to when the bomb would be dropped.

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final directive

[The final directive was prepared by me. It was taken to the acting Chief of Staff, General Handy, for his signature, as it was proper for him to sign it. I could not sign it, properly. And then it was -- he preferred to have it approved in the final form by General Marshall. It was sent to Pottsdam and General Marshall sent back word that it had been approved. It was then handed in person to General Spots, who by that time was taking command of the 20th Air Force in

and underlined so that they were very easily found, a brief description of each of the targets which included the reasons why that would be a suitable target. This document, this brochure, was then shown to Secretary Stimson at his request, and then at the same time to General Marshall. It should have been shown to General Marshall first, but the secretary demanded it on the occasion when I was in his office and there was nothing for me to do but send for it and produce it. He then called General Marshall into the meeting. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ It was approved then, excepting for the inclusion of Kyoto as a target, which was not approved by Secretary Stimson. It was not approved because he felt that Kyoto, despite the fact that it had a population of over a million, everyone of whom over six years old was engaged in war work, was a shrine city and an ancient historical city, it was the ancient capital, and that it would be adverse to our best interests in the future to bomb it. As I like did not ~~make~~ the decision, I discussed it repeatedly with Mr. Stimson in the hopes that he would change his mind. He never did, and as soon as the war ended, I in great haste informed Mr. Stimson that I was awfully glad that he had taken such a firm stand and that he had refused to let us bomb Kyoto. Kyoto would have been the first city bombed, and I think there should be a statue to Secretary Stimson right in the heart of Kyoto for having saved the city, because that is what he did. As a sidelight, I discovered at this time with Kyoto that while Kyoto was

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 Kyoto on list
 age

bombed -- was banned as a bombing target due to our having selected it by the bombers from Japan -- from Guam, that no such instructions had been issued to the Air Force then on Okinawa which was just about ready to start bombing Japan. I told General Arnold about this and how disastrous it would be if the Secretary was suddenly told that Kyoto had been destroyed in the fire-bomb operation and of course an immediate order went out, but it shows what a small thing sometimes happens that saves -- that makes a tremendous change. If Mr. Stimson hadn't turned us down, and if I hadn't then gone and told General Arnold, Kyoto undoubtedly would have been bombed by fire bombs, so if not by the atomic bomb -- so you can see what a small difference it makes. After that approval of the general idea by Mr. Stimson, there was nothing further on the directive until it became time for the issuance of the actual directive. I then took the draft, changed -- made a few minor changes in it to accord with whatever had happened since then, such as the time that the ultimatum in Potsdam was being issued-- things of that kind -- and that directive General Handy felt was of such importance even if Mars had generally approved the directive before, he wanted it approved again, so it was sent to Potsdam and Marshall approved it and sent the word back. One of the interesting features in this directive was a paragraph that informed General Spots -- that told General Spots that he was to show the directive personally